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TAKING TEACHER QUALITY SERIOUSLY
DEREK W. BLACK*
ABSTRACT
Although access to quality teachers is one of the most important
aspects of a quality education, explicit concern with teacher quality
has been conspicuously absent from past litigation over the right to
education. Instead, past litigation has focused almost exclusively on
funding. Though that litigation has narrowed gross fundinggaps be-
tween schools in many states, it has not changed what matters most:
access to quality teachers.
This Article proposes a break from the traditional approach to
litigatingthe constitutional right to education. Rather than constitu-
tionalizingadequate or equal funding, courts should constitutiona-
lize quality teaching. The recent success of the constitutional
challenge to tenure offers the first step in this direction. But the focus
on teacher tenure alone is misplaced. Eliminating tenure, without
addressingmore important fundamental challenges for the teaching
profession, may just make matters worse. Thus, this Article argues
for a broader intervention strategy. When evaluating claims that
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students have been deprived of their constitutional right to educa-
tion, courts should first ensure that states equally distribute existing
quality teachers, regardless of the supply. Courts should then
address state policies that affect the supply of teachers, which include
far more than just salaries. When those remedies still prove insuffi-
cient to ensure access to quality teachers, courts must ensure that the
removal of ineffective teachers is possible.
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INTRODUCTION
Although social science studies and policy analyses uniformly
recognize teacher quality as the primary factor affecting student
achievement,1 past litigation to enforce the constitutional right to
education has primarily focused on money, largely ignoring teach-
ers.2 A surprising number of opinions do not even include the word
teacher.3 The rest tend to relegate teacher quality to one line on
the list of challenges that districts face, assuming that additional
money will cure teaching inadequacies as easily as any other
problem.4 This monetary approach to the constitutional right to
education has resulted in the popular moniker school finance
litigation.5
Last year, however, a California trial court used that precedent
to declare teacher tenure unconstitutional, reasoning that tenure
was the reason why some schools have so many grossly ineffective
teachers.6 As recent scholarship demonstrates, numerous flaws
plague the assumption that tenure causes bad teaching,7 but the
litigation offers important lessons for school finance litigation to
follow. First, tenure challenges are attempting to systematically
move the constitutional doctrines established in school finance
1. See LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICAS
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE (2010); James H. Stronge et al., What
Is the Relationship Between Teacher Quality and Student Achievement?An Exploratory Study,
20 J. PERSONNEL EVALUATION EDUC. 165, 167 (2007).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000) (listing teachers among
various other problems faced by districts); Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
176 S.W.3d 746, 769 (Tex. 2005) (limiting the discussion of teachers to three sentences).
5. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 252-58 (1999)
(analyzing school finance litigation). In all fairness, this term does not apply to all of the
litigation. Some of it is more appropriately termed quality education litigation. See generally
William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis Duringthe Third Wave of School Finance Litigation: The
Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1994) (noting that school finance
litigation has shifted its focus to the quality of education from equal funding).
6. See Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014).
7. See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 75 (2016).
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litigation beyond just money.8 Relying on broadly worded language
from school finance precedent that guarantees students the right
to an equal or quality education, tenure challenges substantiate the
premise that any state policy that systematically and substantially
impedes educational opportunitywhether financially or other-
wiseis unconstitutional.9 In this respect, the doctrinal theory
embedded in the constitutional challenge to tenure expands the
boundaries of the constitutional right to education. Second, the
constitutional challenge to tenure focuses exclusively on the most
important factor in educational outcomes: teacher quality.10 This
focus makes perfect sense. What good is a constitutional right to
education if it cannot ensure students have good teachers? More-
over, this focus prevents other educational issues from obfuscating
the most important issue of teacher quality.
These theoretical advances demand continued attention. This
Article draws on these advances to propose a reinvigorated and
refocused approach to litigating the constitutional right to educa-
tion. While four decades of school finance litigation have closed or
narrowed various funding gaps, many would argue it has done little
to improve the substantive education students receive.11 Its goals
and effects have been too diffuse. If the movement is to remain
relevant, it must mature and deepen its analysis of what matters
most: teacher quality.
The fact that courts have not already shifted their focus to
teachers, however, raises the question of why. One explanation is
that courts have assumed that changes in funding structures would
eventually trickle down to improve teacher quality. Experience has
proven this assumption false. The other explanation is that courts
recognize the challenge of improving teacher quality but believe it
is too complex and politically charged for courts to engage. This
concern has merit. Although everyone agrees that teacher quality
is key to improving educational outcomes, states strategies for im-
proving teaching quality have been all over the board and achieved
8. See id. at 123.
9. See id. at 125-26.
10. See id.
11. See infra Parts II.D-E.
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relatively little.12 On average, poor and minority students are still
exposed to inexperienced, uncredentialed, and unqualified teachers
at twice the rate of other students.13 Courts naturally would be
reluctant to wade into a policy morass regarding teachers that
others have struggled to resolve. Yet the difficulty and contentious-
ness of the issues surrounding the constitutional right to education
are not new, nor have they stopped most courts from acting to
enforce the right.
When students constitutional right to education is in question,
courtsmore than any other government actormust engage and
protect the right, notwithstanding the challenges that doing so
involves.14 For instance, the extent to which money affected ed-
ucational outcomes was far from clear when courts first began
demanding adequate and equitable school finance systems in the
1970s.15 Four decades later, aspects of the debate still linger, but
courts have been able to consistently intervene on the principle
that states must still take reasonable steps to act on what they do
know about money and unequal access to educational opportun-
ities.16 In the absence of such judicial intervention, the complexity
of educational problems too often serves as a convenient excuse for
legislative inaction that, in effect, condones inequality and inade-
quacy.17
12. Over the past two decades, policymakers have shrunk class sizes, increased salaries
across the board, elevated certification requirements, and experimented with paying teachers
for higher performance. See infra Part I.
13. HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, EDUC. TR., TEACHING INEQUALITY: HOW POOR
AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED ON TEACHER QUALITY 2 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 210, 219
(Conn. 2010) ([T]his court has a role in ensuring that our states public school students
receive that fundamental guarantee, and it is ... the duty of the judiciary to determine
whether the legislature has fulfilled its affirmative obligations.); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist.
v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1264 (Wyo. 1995) [hereinafter Campbell I] ([T]he [court] has the
constitutional duty to declare unconstitutional that which transgresses the state consti-
tution.... [O]ur duty to protect individual rights includes compelling legislative action required
by the constitution.).
15. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1973) (indicating
that it was not settled whether money affected educational quality).
16. See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, Meaningful Educational Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1476-87 (2007) (detailing plaintiff
victories).
17. See id. at 1538.
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Todays challenges regarding teacher quality are no different.
While the debate may continue over how to improve teacher quality,
it is clear that quality teachers are central to educational outcomes
and that states have failed to address the issue seriously. Judicial
engagement on teacher quality can break this stalemate or recalci-
trance where it exists.18 To be clear, however, this does not mean
that courts should devise their own education polices or settle social
science disputes. Their role is to create a framework in which states
will focus on evidence and problems that states might otherwise
ignore, and take steps that states might otherwise refuse.19 On this
score, courts are particularly competent.20 They have the ability to
force parties to account for relevant evidence, to determine what the
key issues are, to set standards for dealing with those issues, and to
hold the parties accountable for failing to do so.21 This does not
entail setting policy. It entails forcing states to carry out their con-
stitutional duties.
Toward that end, this Article proposes four careful steps. First,
courts and states should take holistic approaches to improving
teacher quality. Experience and social science teach that there are
no silver bullets to improving education or teacher quality. Neither
narrow attacks on tenure, nor any other singular aspect of teacher
policy, are sufficient. As suggested above, teacher quality is affected
by a multitude of factors other than just salary. Realistic remedies
must, for instance, account for geography, labor market dynamics,
the attractiveness of the teaching profession, segregation, the teach-
ing environment, and structural inequalities between districts.
Second, courts and states should recognize that the unequal dis-
tribution of quality teachers is different than a shortage of quality
18. See, e.g., id. at 1526-29.
19. See id. at 1541-42.
20. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 350 (1996) (Courts have some special
strengthsremoval from politics and the ability to stay with a complex issue long enough to
implement change.); MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (1982).
21. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional Factfindingand the Scope of Judicial Review:
A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2001) (extolling courts fact-finding ability);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1018-21 (2004) (finding that school finance litigation has
improved political negotiations).
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teachers. Even if states cannot increase the supply of quality teach-
ers, the analytical principles developed in school finance litigation
should dictate that states fairly distribute the ones they have.22 In
many ways, this is a more straightforward task than increasing the
supply of quality teachers.
Third, courts and states should analyze the teacher labor market
at a much deeper and more nuanced level than in the past. Closing
basic salary gaps between districts or offering modest across-the-
board salary increases will do little to achieve increases in the
overall supply of quality teachers.23 Increasing the talent pool re-
quires states to make the profession itself more attractive overall.
Evidence shows that, at the very least, attracting more talented
teachers requires that teacher salaries be competitive with job
opportunities outside of teaching24 and that the environment within
which teachers work improve.25 Currently, financial and profes-
sional prestige concerns prevent many of the strongest candidates
from considering teaching in the first instance.26 Strong candidates
who manage to set aside these front-end concerns still remain the
ones most likely to leave the teaching profession later, not just to
make more money but because they find the environment in which
they teach inhospitable.27 The solution, in short, is for courts to
prompt states to treat teachers like professionals, both in the sala-
ries they are offered and the conditions under which they work.
22. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989) (re-
quiring efficient distribution and management of resources); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State,
599 S.E.2d 365, 388-89 (N.C. 2004) (discussing the States and local districts responsibility
to allocate resources strategically). See generally Joshua E. Weishart, TranscendingEquality
Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477 (2014) (discussing distributional theory in the context
of school finance litigation and equality and adequacy of educational opportunity).
23. See generally Donald Boyd et al., UnderstandingTeacher Labor Markets: Implications
for Equity, in SCHOOL FINANCE AND TEACHER QUALITY: EXPLORING THE CONNECTIONS 55, 57
(David H. Monk & Margaret L. Plecki eds., 2003) (finding that factors other than salary play
more important roles in determining where teachers decide to work).
24. See Richard M. Ingersoll & Elizabeth Merrill, The Status of Teachingas a Profession,
in SCHOOLS AND SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO EDUCATION 185, 192-96 (Jeanne H.
Ballantine & Joan Z. Spade eds., 4th ed. 2011).
25. See AMY M. HIGHTOWER ET AL., IMPROVING STUDENT LEARNING BY SUPPORTING QUAL-
ITY TEACHING: KEY ISSUES, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES 16 (2011).
26. See Ingersoll & Merrill, supra note 24, at 192-95.
27. See LINDADARLING-HAMMOND,RECRUITING AND RETAINING TEACHERS:WHATMATTERS
MOST AND WHAT CAN GOVERNMENT DO? (2011), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Darling-Hammond.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UUG-2XBD].
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If states can increase the supply of quality teachers and distrib-
ute them fairly, a fourth point may become relevant: teacher
removal. No matter what steps a state may take to improve teacher
quality, a certain percentage of the teachers will, for a variety of
reasons, fail to perform up to standard. A small percentage of
underperformers do not necessarily undermine a schools overall
education program.28 But to the extent some schools are burdened
with substantial numbers of ineffective teachers, they should not be
stuck with them.29 States must make removal, if necessary, a
realistic possibility. This may or may not involve altering tenure,
but it necessarily requires states to do two things: (1) help needy
districts shoulder the financial and administrative burdens of
terminating teachers, and (2) take the predicate steps outlined
above to improve the profession so that disadvantaged schools can
fill vacancies with stronger teachers.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with an over-
view of the social science on the importance and effects of quality
teachers. That overview is followed by a detailed analysis of the
various policies that states have implemented to improve teaching,
including why those policies have failed. Part II examines the role
school finance litigation has played, or not played, in improving
teaching, concluding that the litigation has either ignored or grossly
oversimplified the problem. Part II then offers the rationale for why
courts must deepen their analysis of teacher quality and how they
can avoid separation of powers concerns. Part III identifies both the
flaws and theoretical breakthroughs of the constitutional challenges
to tenure and applies them to school finance precedent, as well as
the social science literature on improving teacher quality. Based on
this background, the Article proposes a framework for adjudicating
the constitutional right to education.
28. Kevin G. Welner, Silver Linings Casebook: How Vergaras Backers May Lose by Win-
ning, 15 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 121, 130-36 (2015).
29. Current data suggests disadvantaged schools do have large numbers of ineffective
teachers. See EDUC. TR., THEIR FAIR SHARE: HOW TEXAS-SIZED GAPS IN TEACHER QUALITY
SHORTCHANGE LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY STUDENTS 3-4 (2008). This proportion, however,
would presumably change with a change in the market.
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I. THE FAILURE OF PUBLIC POLICY TO DELIVER TEACHING QUALITY
The importance of quality teachers is beyond dispute, but dis-
agreements abound as to what makes a good teacher. Do experience,
credentials, certification, or environmental factors correlate with
quality? Some argue that none of these factors correlate with
teaching quality and that the only proof of teaching quality is in the
puddinghow a teachers students perform on standardized ex-
ams.30 Regardless, by almost any definition or measure, there is a
shortage of high-quality teachers, and disadvantaged students have
the least access to them.31 The combination of this shortage and its
importance to student outcomes has generated a number of systemic
responses over the past two decades.32 The responses have ranged
from shrinking class sizes and raising certification expectations to
increasing teachers salaries, offering pay for performance incen-
tives, and evaluating teachers based on their students test scores.33
The following Sections address each of these policies and explain
why these policies have yet to resolve the fundamental problems of
identifying and increasing quality teaching.
A. The Impact of Quality Teaching
The research on teacher quality has grown steadily in the last
three decades. The research findings consistently conclude that
teacher quality is among the most significant variables in student
outcomes.34 Although a students socioeconomic status, along with
that of his peers, exerts an enormous influence on educational
30. See DANIEL F. MCCAFFREY ET AL., EVALUATING VALUE-ADDED MODELS FOR TEACHER
ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2003).
31. See PESKE & HAYCOCK, supra note 13, at 1-2.
32. See ROBERT GORDON ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., IDENTIFYING EFFECTIVE TEACHERS
USING PERFORMANCE ON THE JOB 5 (2006).
33. See infra Parts I.B-F.
34. See Dan Goldhaber, Teachers Clearly Matter, but FindingEffective Teacher Policies
Has Proven Challenging, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 157
(Helen F. Ladd & Margaret E. Goertz eds., 2d ed. 2015) (tracing the history of research on
teacher quality); Joseph O. Oluwole, Tenure and the Highly Qualified Teacher Requirement,
8 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 157, 158 (2009) (discussing the various studies [that]
have shown that teachers are important to student achievement).
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outcomes,35 teacher quality is generally recognized as the most
important school resource affecting student achievement.36 In ad-
dition, although quality teaching is important for all students, it is
most important for disadvantaged students.37
The challenge, however, has been ensuring that all students have
access to competent, caring, qualified teaching in schools organized
for success.38 Students who need qualified teachers the mostpoor
and minority studentshave the least access to them. Students
attending predominantly poor and minority schools are assigned to
novice teachers at twice the rate as students in low-poverty schools
and predominantly white schools.39 Likewise, students in disadvan-
taged schools are taught by out-of-field teachers at a much higher
rate than other students.40
The long-term effects of this inequality are tremendous. Consis-
tent exposure to low- or high-quality teachers over the course of
years has a compounding effect for individual students and the
nation as a whole.41 One prominent study found that having a
35. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS
THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 47-76 (2001); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v.
Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV.L.REV. 1334, 1355-
56 (2004).
36. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review
of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDUC. POLY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2000) (finding teacher quality
to be strongly related to student achievement based on a fifty-state survey and the National
Assessment of Educational Progress); Goldhaber, supra note 34; Steven G. Rivkin, Eric A.
Hanushek & John F. Kain, Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA
417 (2005).
37. See LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, NATL COMMN ON TEACHING & AM.S FUTURE, DOING
WHAT MATTERS MOST: INVESTING IN QUALITY TEACHING (1997); GORDON ET AL., supra note
32, at 8; Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: Research Review, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC.
(Nov. 1, 2005), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/main-menu/staffingstudents/teacher-
quality-and-student-achievement-at-a-glance/teacher-quality-and-student-achievement-
research-review.html [https://perma.cc/CC3D-VKSD] (finding the effect of teaching on student
learning is stronger for poor and/or minority students than for their more affluent and/or
white peers, and the effect accumulates over time).
38. NATL COMMN ON TEACHING & AM.S FUTURE, WHAT MATTERS MOST: TEACHING FOR
AMERICAS FUTURE 10 (1996).
39. See PESKE & HAYCOCK, supra note 13, at 2; see also Charles Clotfelter et al., High-
Poverty Schools and the Distribution of Teachers and Principals, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2007).
40. PESKE & HAYCOCK, supra note 13, at 2-3.
41. See MCCAFFREY ET AL., supra note 30, at xii-xv; Robert L. Mendro et al., An Applica-
tion of Multiple Linear Regression in Determining Longitudinal Teacher Effectiveness (Apr.
1998) (Paper Presentation at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research
Association).
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top-quartile teacher rather than a bottom-quartile teacher four
years in a row would be enough to close the black-white test score
gap.42 This unequal access is sufficiently pervasive that scholars
argue that it depresses overall national achievement.43
B. ShrinkingClass Size
In the 1990s, the way to improve teaching was thought to be to
change the environment in which teachers work, not the teachers
themselves. In particular, researchers thought that shrinking class
size might maximize teachers and students potential.44 The move-
ment to shrink class size grew out of a longitudinal study by the
State of Tennessee.45 The study found that students assigned to
smaller classes passed the States standardized language and math
tests at higher rates than others.46 The findings were even clearer
in regard to grade retention. Schools retained students in larger
classrooms at twice the rate of those in small classes.47 Based on
these findings, the State developed a pilot program and study in
three school systems.48 This study confirmed the earlier findings
with even stronger results.49 In Nashvilleone of the pilot dis-
trictsstudents who attended small classes (K-3) consistently
made better grades than students in regular and regular/aide
42. GORDON ET AL., supra note 32, at 8. See generally Elizabeth Powell, The Quest for
Teacher Quality: Early Lessons from Race to the Top and State Legislative Efforts Regarding
Teacher Evaluation, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1061, 1070 (2013) (This significant finding has
heavily shaped education policy over the last several years.).
43. See ROBIN CHAIT, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, REMOVING CHRONICALLY INEFFECTIVE
TEACHERS:BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2010) ([D]ismissing the bottom quartile of novice
teachers in the district after their first year based on value-added estimates would result in
a net increase in student test scores gains of 1.2 percentage points annually across the
district.); Eric A. Hanushek, Valuing Teachers: How Much Is a Good Teacher Worth?, 11
EDUC. NEXT 41, 43 (2011).
44. See Gregory C. Malhoit & Derek W. Black, The Power of Small Schools: Archiving
Equal Educational Opportunity Through Academic Success and Democratic Citizenship, 82
NEB. L. REV. 50, 72-73 (2003).
45. HELEN PATE-BAIN ET AL., HEROS, INC., THE STUDENT/TEACHER ACHIEVEMENT RATIO
(STAR)PROJECT:STAR FOLLOW-UP STUDIES, 1996-1997 (1997), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/
ED419593.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVB9-4726].
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id. at 12.
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id. at 23.
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classes .... In English, math, and science, the students in the small
classes outscored their counterparts by over 10 points.50
The Tennessee study sparked a growing body of research and
public policy responses. Independent studies found that smaller
classesdefined as those with fifteen to twenty studentscan boost
student achievement, particularly in early grades and particularly
for minority and low-income students.51 These findings quickly
translated into legislation and litigation. Several states began leg-
islating maximum class sizes and secured Congresss help in fund-
ing them.52 School finance litigators also began including social
science evidence on class size in their cases, either arguing that
large classes were part of a constitutional violation by the state or
that smaller classes would help the state to remedy other deficien-
cies in the education system.53 The collective result was a steady
reduction in class size between 2000 and 2008.54
Despite the quick pursuit of class size reduction, the movement
to further reduce or maintain small class sizes has been beset by
problems. First, some policymakers and researchers began to assert
that class size reduction was not improving student outcomes as a
general principle.55 Others were more nuanced, claiming smaller
classes did not matter in higher grades, did not matter for middle-
income students, and reduced teacher quality because schools were
forced to hire too many new teachers too quickly.56 Still others did
50. Id. at 17-18.
51. See, e.g., PENNY FIDLER, L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., THE IMPACT OF CLASS SIZE
REDUCTION ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT 2 (2001); DIANE WHITMORE SCHANZENBACH, NATL
EDUC.POLY CTR.,DOES CLASS SIZE MATTER? (2014), http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/does-
class-size-matter [https://perma.cc/7F58-4SL9].
52. EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUC. RES. CTR., NATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS REPORT: QUALITY
COUNTS 10 (2008) (finding that eighteen states had programs to limit or reduce class size in
place); Wendy Schwartz, Class Size Reduction and Urban Students, ERICDIGESTS.ORG, http://
www.ericdigests.org/2003-4/class-size.html [https://perma.cc/6D8Q-HK3F].
53. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 745 (Ohio 1997); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ.
v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *100 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000) (pointing
out the value of smaller classes, particularly for at-risk students), affd in part, revd in part,
599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004); see also Malhoit & Black, supra note 44, at 72-73 (maintaining
that small classes have numerous positive learning and teaching outcomes).
54. SCHANZENBACH, supra note 51, at 7.
55. See, e.g., 7 Myths of Class Size Reduction And the Truth!, CLASS SIZE MATTERS, http:
//www.classsizematters.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FAQ-7-myths-04.26.13.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6366-JBYG] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
56. Id.
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not question the positive effect of smaller classes but argued that,
from a cost-benefit analysis, the money could be better spent on
other education reforms.57
Second, the financial commitment required to reduce class size is
significant and hard to maintain. After the initial fervor wore off,
states began to allow class sizes to creep up for a number of rea-
sons.58 In some instances, the explanation is no more complicated
than the fact that some other agenda arose demanding money.59
Class size caps were most often self-imposed, and thus, legislatures
could easily raise the cap by a student or two occasionally.60 The
Great Recession pushed this dynamic to the extreme. In just the one
year between 2009 and 2010, all the progress in reducing class size
over the previous eight years was lost.61 This backtrack on class size
occurred with relatively little pushback, presumably because of the
extent of the economic crisis, the cost-benefit concerns, and the
other critiques noted above.62
Finally, the critique of class size reduction and the actual retreat
from it may have been clouded by misleading data and assump-
tions. School- or district-wide student-to-teacher ratios, which tend
to be the primary data point on which the conversation has focused,
are not necessarily instructive or responsive to the more nuanced
findings in the Tennessee study. That a district or schools average
student-to-teacher ratio falls within acceptable levels does not mean
that the district or school maintains that level across all classes or
even in the most important classes. School-wide student-to-teacher
ratios include special education and other specialized teachers who
teach very small classes. Factoring them out causes the average
class size to jump dramatically.63 Rather than a national student-to-
57. See GROVER J. RUSS WHITEHURST & MATTHEW M. CHINGOS, BROOKINGS INST., CLASS
SIZE: WHAT RESEARCH SAYS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR STATE POLICY 3-4, 13 (2011), http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/5/11-class-size-whitehurst-chingos/
0511_class_size_whitehurst_chingos.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AFF-JR9F] (finding that the class
size reductions were too costly in twenty-four states).
58. See SCHANZENBACH, supra note 51, at 7-8.
59. See id. at 8.
60. Id. at 7-8.
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. See Sarah D. Sparks, Class Sizes Show Signs of Growing, EDUC. WK. (Nov. 24, 2010),
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/11/24/13size_ep.h30.html [https://perma.cc/99QJ-RF
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teacher ratio of one to eighteen or nineteen, the ratio would be one
to twenty-five.64 In other words, schools never reduced class size to
the point at which they would have achieved the important gains
expected. In sum, the current narrative operates on the assumption
that class sizes were small enough and, if not, it does not matter
anyway.
C. Certifyingand CredentialingTeachers
Class size reductions may have indirectly highlighted and exacer-
bated the shortage of high-quality teachers as they created demand
that exceeded the supply. Class size reduction caused a migration
of teachers not only between and among districts, but also from non-
K-3 classrooms into newly reduced K-3 classrooms.65 And those
desirable districts with more resources could hire strong teachers
from other districts, leaving the less desirable districts without
strong candidates to fill their existing vacancies, much less to re-
duce class size.66 Regardless, the past two decades have brought a
litany of policies heavily focused on raising the bar for teacher
quality rather than the conditions under which they teach.
The traditional model of improving teacher quality relies on
certifications and credentials, either through degrees, testing mech-
anisms, or training programs.67 Most states, however, did little to
mandate high credentials or prevent schools from hiring teachers
with low credentials. Even when states increased standards, they
often grandfathered experienced teachers into the new regime,
whichright or wrongexempted a large portion of teachers from
EC].
64. Id.
65. See EDWARD WEXLER ET AL., CALIFORNIAS CLASS SIZE REDUCTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR
EQUITY, PRACTICE, & IMPLEMENTATION 3 (1998) (finding a shift in teacher movement from
nonclass size reduction to class size reduction); David P. Sims, CrowdingPeter to Educate
Paul: Lessons from a Class Size Reduction Externality, 28 ECON. EDUC. REV. 465, 467 (2009).
66. See Christopher Jepsen & Steven Rivkin, Class Size Reduction and Student
Achievement: The Potential Tradeoff Between Teacher Quality and Class Size, 44 J. HUM. RES.
223, 224 (2009) (finding that well-qualified teachers migrated to more affluent communities,
prompting lower quality in South Central Los Angeles).
67. Jerry R. Parkinson, The Use of Competency Testingin the Evaluation of Public School
Teachers, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 845, 845 (1991) (A majority of states now employ competency
tests as a prerequisite to the initial certification of prospective teachers.).
2016] TAKING TEACHER QUALITY SERIOUSLY 1613
having to comply with the quality standards.68 The No Child Left
Behind Act (NCLB) sought to address these problems by imposing
a uniform national mandate that all teachers of core subjects must
be highly qualified.69
While theoretically a major step forward, NCLB was beset by
limitations and did little to change the underlying fundamentals of
the teaching force. Rather than set a national standard for high-
quality teachers, NCLB afforded states discretion to define and
measure what constituted a high-quality teacher.70 When confronted
with shortages in quality teachers, states were incentivized to rede-
fine and lower the meaning of quality, not raise it.71 Thus, the more
fundamental problem is that certification requirements did nothing
to increase the number of available qualified teachers.
NCLB reporting requirements simply revealed how many uncer-
tified and low-credentialed personnel teach in our nations schools.72
It also confirmed that poor and minority students are exposed to
low-credentialed teachers at much higher rates than other stu-
dents.73 In fact, notwithstanding the states ability to manipulate
the definition of quality, the fundamental market problems with
generating and distributing quality teachers were so serious that
violations of the teacher mandate mounted quicker than violations
of any other requirement of NCLB.74
68. Id. at 845-46 (discussing states reluctance to require previously certified teachers to
pass a competency examination).
69. 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)(2) (2012).
70. Id. § 7801(23) (establishing baseline from which states define highly qualified).
71. See generally James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2004).
72. EDUC. COMMN OF THE STATES, ECS REPORT TO THE NATION: STATE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 69 (2004).
73. See, e.g., EDUC. TR., supra note 29, at 11 (finding that less credentialed teachers are
concentrated in predominantly poor and minority schools); SUSANNA LOEB & MICHELLE
REININGER, PUBLIC POLICY AND TEACHER LABOR MARKETS: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHY IT
MATTERS 1 (2004); Frank Adamson & Linda Darling-Hammond, FundingDisparities and the
Inequitable Distribution of Teachers: EvaluatingSources and Solutions, 20 EDUC. POLY ANAL-
YSIS ARCHIVES 1, 4 (2012).
74. EDUC. COMMN OF THE STATES, supra note 72, at 69; see also John W. Sipple & Brian
O. Brent, Challenges and Strategies Associated with Rural Schools Settings, in HANDBOOK OF
RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY, supra note 34, at 607, 611-12 (finding rural
schools often violate the NCLB requirement that teachers be highly qualified because their
teachers are often responsible for teaching multiple subjects).
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Even assuming these market problems could be resolved, the
overall credentialing model is subject to common sense and em-
pirical attack. The model rests on the huge assumption that teach-
ing credentials are a reliable proxy for teacher quality. Although
certain basic qualifications are surely necessary to be a competent
and effective teacher,75 studies generally show that both teacher
credentials and experience (beyond novices) are poor proxies for
teaching effectiveness or quality.76 The overall literature is mixed or
negative on the questions of teacher characteristics such as state
and subject-specific certification,77 in-field and out-of-field training,78
advanced degrees,79 and National Board Certification (NBC).80 Only
75. See Dan D. Goldhaber & Dominic J. Brewer, Does Teacher Certification Matter?High
School Teacher Certification Status and Student Achievement, 22 EDUC. EVALUATION & POLY
ANALYSIS 129, 129 (2000).
76. See Marco A. Muñoz & Florence C. Chang, The Elusive Relationship Between Teacher
Characteristics and Student Academic Growth: A Longitudinal Multilevel Model for Change,
20 J. PERSONNEL EVALUATION EDUC. 147, 148 (2007) (results are mixed as to whether teacher
qualifications matter); Powell, supra note 42, at 1068 ([After NCLB,] it became apparent
that .... [h]ighly qualified teachers were not necessarily highly effective.).
77. See LAURA GOE, THE LINK BETWEEN TEACHER QUALITY AND STUDENT OUTCOMES: A
RESEARCHSYNTHESIS 43 (2007), http://www.gtlcenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/LinkBetween
TQandStudentOutcomes.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JVZ-RKF3]; KATE WALSH, TEACHER CERTIFI-
CATION RECONSIDERED:STUMBLING FOR QUALITY 12, 41 (2001), http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/
Teacher_Certification_Reconsidered_Stumbling_for_Quality_NCTQ_Report [https://perma.
cc/2SNW-GDZP] (reviewing 150 studies and finding that certified teachers are not more effec-
tive); Dan D. Goldhaber & Dominic J. Brewer, Evaluatingthe Effect of Teacher Degree Level
on Educational Performance, in DEVELOPMENTS IN SCHOOL FINANCE, 1996, at 197, 205 (1997)
(finding students learn less from English teachers who held general teacher certification than
from those who were not certified).
78. See GOE, supra note 77, at 24, 44.
79. See, e.g., MARGUERITE ROZA & RAEGEN T. MILLER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SEP-
ARATION OF DEGREES: STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF TEACHER COMPENSATION FOR MASTERS
DEGREES 1 (2009), https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/07/pdf/
masters_degrees.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E2P-R66E]; Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, supra note 36,
at 419.
80. Compare LINDA C. CAVALLUZZO, THE CNA CORP., IS NATIONAL BOARD CERTIFICATION
AN EFFECTIVE SIGNAL OF TEACHER QUALITY? 3 (2004) http://www.nbpts.org/sites/default/files/
documents/research/Cavalluzzo_IsNBCAnEffectiveSignalofTeachingQuality.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BLU9-HQA8] (finding NBC to be a signal of teacher qualilty), and Leslie G.
Vandevoort et al., National Board Certified Teachers and Their Students Achievement, 12
EDUC. POLY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 36 (2004) (finding that NBC has an effect of student
achievement), with WILLIAM L. SANDERS ET AL., COMPARISON OF THE EFFECTS OF NBPTS
CERTIFIED TEACHERS WITH OTHER TEACHERS ON THE RATE OF STUDENT ACADEMIC PROGRESS:
FINAL REPORT 2 (2005), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED491846.pdf [https://perma.cc/E43R-
6QRQ] (finding that students with NBC teachers did not make significantly more academic
progress than those with non-NBC teachers), and Steven Cantrell et al., National Board
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with math and science teachers have studies tended to show that
teacher credentials have a meaningful impact on student achieve-
ment. But even there, only some credentials matter.81 Those studies
generally found that students exhibit larger gains in mathematics,
and to a lesser extent in science, when they are taught by an in-
subject-area teacher82 who is nationally or state certified and
trained in the subject.83
D. RaisingTeacher Salaries
Raising teacher salaries is intuitively the most obvious strategy
to increase the quality and quantity of teachers. Research shows
that teachers, like any other professionals, generally respond to
salary.84 College students decisions about whether to enter the
profession are influenced by salary, and the decision of where to
teach and how long they stay are also influenced by salary.85 The
most qualified teachers, in particular, are the most sensitive to rela-
tive changes in salaries.86 The shortage of high-quality teachers in
Certification and Teacher Effectiveness: Evidence from a Random Assignment Experiment 37
(Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14608, 2008) (finding no statistically
significant differences between the math and language arts test scores of students assigned
to NBC-certified teachers).
81. See JENNIFER KING RICE, TEACHER QUALITY: UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
TEACHERATTRIBUTES49-51(2003); Andrew J. Wayne & Peter Youngs, Teacher Characteristics
and Student Achievement Gains: A Review, 73 REV. EDUC. RES. 89, 107 (2003).
82. See CAVALLUZZO, supra note 80, at 1-2; Audrey Amrein-Beardsley, Teacher Research
InformingPolicy: An Analysis of Research on Highly Qualified Teachingand NCLB, 17 ES-
SAYS EDUC. (2006), http://www.usca.edu/essays/vol17summer2006.html [https://perma.cc/
6LKH-9VPJ].
83. See Matthew M. Chingos & Paul E. Peterson, Its Easier to Pick a Good Teacher than
to Train One: Familiar and New Results on the Correlates of Teacher Effectiveness, 30 ECON.
EDUC. REV. 449, 450 (2011); Linda Darling-Hammond, Barnett Berry & Amy Thoreson, Does
Teacher Certification Matter?Evaluatingthe Evidence, 23 EDUC. EVALUATION & POLY ANAL-
YSIS 57, 68 (2001) (finding that teachers who have more education training versus content
training in the area in which they teach appear to do better in improving student achieve-
ment); David H. Monk, Subject Area Preparation of Secondary Mathematics and Science
Teachers and Student Achievement, 13 ECON. EDUC. REV. 125, 142 (1994).
84. LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 39-40; Boyd et al., supra note 23; Eric A.
Hanushek & Richard R. Pace, Who Chooses to Teach (and Why)?, 14 ECON. EDUC. REV. 101,
114 (1995).
85. See LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 39-40; Boyd et al., supra note 23.
86. Marigee P. Bacolod, Do Alternative Opportunities Matter?The Role of Female Labor
Markets in the Decline of Teacher Quality, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 737, 748 (2007); Karen J.
DeAngelis, The Relationship Between Teachers Salaries and the Quality of the Supply of
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areas of high need has, nonetheless, remained resistant to change
through teacher salary adjustments, although the problem appears
to be that the salary increases and adjustments offered have been
wholly inadequate.
Today, teacher salaries more closely resemble salaries of social
workers, ministers, and clerical staff than those of other profession-
als.87 Thus, even if higher salaries work, states have not systematic-
ally implemented them. Making matters worse, within the overall
system of depressed wages, school districts have wildly unequal fi-
nancial capacities to attract candidates.88 As a result of financial
inequality, a sorting of quality teachers occurs at the initial hiring
stage and at the transfer stage that drives the highest quality teach-
ers away from districts with students who need them most.89
With that said, salaries are just one of several factors that affect
teachers employment decisions. In fact, within currently existing
salary scales and incentives, salary may be the least important of
the relevant factors.90 Geographic location,91 the demographics of
the students they teach,92 and the conditions under which they
teach93such as class size, support staff, and facilitiesmay all be
Recent College Graduates to Teaching 167 (Mar. 2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stan-
ford University).
87. Susanna Loeb & Tara Béteille, Teacher Labor Markets and Teacher Labor Market
Research, in TEACHER QUALITY: BROADENING AND DEEPENING THE DEBATE 27, 35-36 (Greg
Duncan & James Spillane eds., 2008).
88. LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 42; Adamson & Darling-Hammond, supra note
73; Boyd et al., supra note 23, at 73-75.
89. LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 42; Gregory Gilpin, Salary Schedules, Teacher
Sorting, and Teacher Quality 1 (Ctr. Applied Econ. & Poly Res., Working Paper No. 2011-004,
2011).
90. Boyd et al., supra note 23; Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, Pay, WorkingCondi-
tions, and Teacher Quality, 17 FUTURE CHILD. 69, 76 (2007) (For those teachers who move,
the type of students changes far more than their salaries do.); see also JASON AMOS, ALL. FOR
EXCELLENT EDUC., POLICY BRIEF: IMPROVING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TEACHERS IN LOW-
PERFORMING HIGH SCHOOLS (2008), http://all4ed.org/wp-content/uploads/TeachDist_Policy
Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/53A5-SZWV] (finding that pay increase alone is insufficient to
attract teachers).
91. LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 48; Boyd et al., supra note 23.
92. See Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, Why Public Schools Lose
Teachers, 39 J.HUM.RES. 326, 350-51 (2004); Susanna Loeb, Linda Darling-Hammond & John
Luczak, How TeachingConditions Predict Teacher Turnover in California Schools, 80 PEA-
BODY J. EDUC. 44, 65 (2005); Wendy Parker, DesegregatingTeachers, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1,
35-37 (2008).
93. LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 46-47; Adamson & Darling-Hammond, supra
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more important. Studies show that although teachers respond to
wages, they respond to differing wages within a region more than
they do across regions.94 In other words, geography trumps salary.
Likewise, a large body of literature identifies poor working condi-
tions as a primary determinate of why teachers switch schools or
quit the profession altogether.95 Salary incentives in these schools
are really just an attempt to offset the burden of the undesirable en-
vironment and thus must be large enough to create a net positive
offset for relevant teachers.96
Although they claim to care about teacher shortages and mal-
distributions, states and local school districts have not seriously
responded to the foregoing dynamics.97 There have been some
across-the-board changes to salary, but almost none have actually
changed the prevailing teacher market.98 Regardless, because mon-
ey alone is not the problem, money alone cannot be the solution, at
least not without inefficiently throwing money at the problem.99
Effective solutions require comprehensive approaches that target
teaching shortages and maldistribution in the locations where they
arise, the environmental conditions that produce them, and the
market forces that exacerbate the problem.100
note 73, at 9.
94. See LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 42, 44; Boyd et al., supra note 23.
95. See LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 35-36; Adamson & Darling-Hammond, supra
note 73, at 9.
96. See, e.g., BARNETT BERRY ET AL., RECRUITING AND RETAINING QUALITY TEACHERS FOR
HIGH-NEEDS SCHOOLS: INSIGHTS FROM NBCT SUMMITS AND OTHER POLICY INITIATIVES 4-5
(2009), http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE/mf_nationalstrategyforumreport.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8YJB-NW8J]; DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 27, at 12.
97. See, e.g., LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 55 tbl.18 (finding that only two to seven
states had policies to help attract and retain qualified teachers in high-need schools, depend-
ing on the policy option in question); id. at 56 tbl.19 (finding that often only 10 to 20 percent
of the largest school districts had policies targeted at attracting and retaining teachers in
high-need schools).
98. See generally David P. Sims, Suing for Your Supper?Resource Allocation, Teacher
Compensation and Finance Lawsuits, 30 ECON. EDUC. REV. 1034 (2011).
99. Hanushek & Rivkin, supra note 90, at 82; Susanna Loeb & Marianne E. Page, Exam-
iningthe Link Between Teacher Wages and Student Outcomes: The Importance of Alternative
Labor Market Opportunities and Non-Pecuniary Variation, 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 393, 407
(2000); Allison McKie, The Short-Run Effect of State-Mandated Salary Increases on Teacher
Qualifications: Do States Get What They Pay For? 21 (Nov. 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
https://economics.missouri.edu/seminars/files/2005/mckie_feb_04_2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U6HE-E43L].
100. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 27, at 1.
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E. PayingTeachers for High Performance
With the perceived failure of class size reduction, credentialing,
and general salary increases, states have begun to move toward
personnel management strategies based on statistical analysis and
performance incentives. These are premised on the notion that
teachers should be managed in similar ways to the private work-
force. Schools should closely monitor teachers work outputs and
reward or hold teachers accountable for them. According to reform-
ers, the lack of incentives or accountability creates a disincentive to
teaching excellence and, over time, leads to instructional lethargy
where the lowest performer sets the standard for the entire staff.101
On the incentives side, reformers have pushed almost exclusively
for pay-for-performance based on improving students standardized
test scores.102 Those teachers whose students meet certain achieve-
ment benchmarks would receive bonuses.103 Pay-for-performance
has a lot of intuitive appeal, but no social science actually supports
its adoption.104 Thus, pay-for-performance has been implemented
mostly in terms of limited experiments in a few large urban cen-
ters.105
101. Ralph D. Mawdsley et al., A Law Too Far? The Wisconsin Budget Repair Act: Coun-
terpoint, 275 EDUC. L. REP. 16, 19 (2012).
102. See Goldhaber, supra note 34, at 157-58; Eric A. Hanushek & Alfred A. Lindseth,
Performance-Based Funding, in SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND STATEHOUSES: SOLVING
THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICAS PUBLIC SCHOOLS 241 (2009); Matthew G.
Springer et al., History and Scholarship RegardingU.S. Education Finance and Policy, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY, supra note 34, at 3, 15. See
generally HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED REFORM IN EDUCATION
(Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996).
103. See Stephanie M. Martin, The Determinants of School District Salary Incentives: An
Empirical Analysis of, Where and Why, 29 ECON. EDUC. REV. 1143, 1143 (2010); Matthew G.
Springer, Rethinking Teacher Compensation Policies: Why Now, Why Again?, in PERFOR-
MANCE INCENTIVES: THEIR GROWING IMPACT ON AMERICAN K-12 EDUCATION 5 (Matthew G.
Springer ed., 2009); see also HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE, supra note 102.
104. See Springer, supra note 103, at 14-15 (explaining that the appeal is enhanced by the
growing recognition that teacher quality is key to student outcomes, but the link between
teacher experience and educational credentials and student achievement is weak).
105. See, e.g., Roland G. Fryer, Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from
New York City Public Schools, 31 J. LAB. ECON. 373, 375-76 (2013).
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The results of these experiments have not been promising.106 A
RAND summary of the overall body of research found that pay-for-
performance did not improve student achievement at any grade
level[;] ... did not affect teachers reported attitudes, perceptions, or
behaviors; and although [m]any teachers reported that while the
bonus was desirable, the program did not change their teaching
practices.107 The problems with the programs have included lack of
sufficient teacher buy-in,108 high-pressure environments that incen-
tivized a narrowing of the curriculum109 and sometimes cheating,110
and overly complex systems that left teachers uncertain how to earn
a bonus or resentful of those who did.111 These results have not
106. MATTHEW G. SPRINGER ET AL., NATL CTR. ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES, FINAL RE-
PORT:EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM THE PROJECT ON INCENTIVES IN TEACHING 142-43 (2012),
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/performanceincentives/files/2012/09/Full-Final-Report-Experimental-
Evidence-from-the-Project-on-Incentives-in-Teaching-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/MA5J-KZ28];
MATTHEW G. SPRINGER ET AL., NATL CTR. ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES, TEACHER PAY FOR
PERFORMANCE: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM THE PROJECT ON INCENTIVES IN TEACHING 45-
46 (2010), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/performanceincentives/files/2012/09/Full-Report-Teacher-
Pay-for-Performance-Experimental-Evidence-from-the-Project-on-Incentives-in-Teaching-2010
4.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VBK-BWJV].
107. Evaluatingthe Effectiveness of Teacher Pay-for-Performance,RANDEDUC., http://www.
rand.org/capabilities/solutions/evaluating-the-effectiveness-of-teacher-pay-for-performance.
html [https://perma.cc/BDD5-L236] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
108. See ALLAN ODDEN & CAROLYN KELLEY, PAYING TEACHERS FOR WHAT THEY KNOW AND
DO: NEW AND SMARTER COMPENSATION STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE SCHOOLS 60-61 (2002);
Thomas Dee & James Wyckoff, Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from
IMPACT 1 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19529, 2013); Jiefang Hu,
Teacher Evaluation Based on an Aspect of Classroom Practice and on Student Achievement:
A Relational Analysis Between Student Learning Objectives and Value-Added Modeling 28-29
(May 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College) (on file with Boston College
University Libraries) (explaining difficulties in sufficient teacher buy-in through traditional
teacher evaluation systems).
109. See, e.g., Wayne Au, High-Stakes Testing and Curricular Control: A Qualitative
Metasynthesis, 36 EDUC. RESEARCHER 258, 262 (2007); Gordon Cawelti, The Side Effects of
NCLB, 64 EDUC. LEADERSHIP 64 (Schools end up narrowing the curriculum because they are
under considerable pressure to show adequate yearly progress in reading and math.); Aaron
Schutz, Home Is a Prison in the Global City: The Tragic Failure of School-Based Community
Engagement Strategies, 76 REV. EDUC. RES. 691, 701 (2006).
110. The worst example was in Atlanta and ultimately led to the criminal prosecution and
conviction of eight educators. Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, Atlanta School Workers
Sentenced in Test Score CheatingCase, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/04/15/us/atlanta-school-workers-sentenced-in-test-score-cheating-case.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/AZ26-MY52].
111. Fryer, supra note 105, at 402; Michael D. Siciliano, The Impact of Internal Com-
petition on Collaboration in Public Organizations (June 20, 2013) (on file with the University
of Wisconsin) (Paper Presentation at the 11th Public Management Research Conference).
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ended the call for performance pay, but they have seriously slowed
its growth and directed more focus to simply evaluating teachers
based on performance.
F. IdentifyingTeacher Effectiveness Through Student Test Scores
Over the past decade, reformers have pushed for much more so-
phisticated statistical analyses of the entire teaching force.112 Based
on those analyses, the least effective teachers would be remediated
or terminated, and only those teachers receiving consistently effec-
tive ratings would be granted tenure.113 The highest performing
teachers might or might not be financially rewarded. Such a system,
however, requires an entire reenvisioning of teachers rights and
management. Currently, seniority systems, tenure, and due process
protections place significant limitations on personnel actions.114
Traditionally, a school could remove a tenured teacher only on
statutory grounds, which were limited to misconduct and perfor-
mance.115 Performance-based removal typically required a demon-
strated record of incompetent teaching over a period of years.116
112. See U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009),
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5FU-
S6BF] (requiring states to build data systems that measure student growth and success);
see also NATL COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, STATE OF THE STATES 2012: TEACHER
EFFECTIVENESSPOLICIES 2-3 (2012), http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/State_of_the_States_2012_
Teacher_Effec tiveness_Policies_NCTQ_Report [https://perma.cc/K53J-324Y] (finding that
more states have turned to using more in-depth data on teacher performance in the granting
of tenure).
113. See generally Melinda Adnot & James Wyckoff, Increasingthe Effectiveness of Teach-
ers in Low-Performing Schools, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND
POLICY, supra note 34, at 528, 531-34 (advocating that teaching quality will improve once
effective teachers are properly retained and ineffective teachers are either retrained or re-
moved).
114. See, e.g., PATRICK MCGUINN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RINGING THE BELL FOR K-12
TEACHER TENURE REFORM 4 (2010), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
issues/2010/02/pdf/teacher_tenure.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4U7-KBWZ]; Nicholas Dagostino,
Note, Givingthe School Bully a Timeout: Protecting Urban Students from Teachers Unions,
63 ALA. L. REV. 177, 196 (2011) (critiquing the role of seniority rather than teaching effective-
ness in layoffs); Stephen Sawchuk, Laws Varied for Teachers Due Process, EDUC. WK., Sept.
24, 2014, at 1, 14.
115. See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:442 (2014); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 122A.41 (West 2008); see
also Sawchuk, supra note 114, at 14 (analyzing several state discharge statutes).
116. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.170(a)(1) (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-301
(West 2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-151(d) (West 2015).
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During this time, schools would afford a teacher notice of his
deficiency and an opportunity to improve.117 Only after that oppor-
tunity could a school begin the termination process, which still
required the school to demonstrate the teachers incompetence with
evidence and allow the teacher to contest the schools evidence and
conclusions through administrative hearings and appeals.118
Reformers argue that this process makes removing even the most
grossly ineffective teachers from the classroom extremely difficult
and costly.119
This all changed in 2008: the recession created a freefall in state
revenues; demands to improve teacher quality in some way other
than NCLBs credentialing model were increasing; and Congress
had allocated funding to the Department of Education through its
economic stimulus package in order to foster reform.120 The Depart-
ment offered states money to begin experimenting with data-based
teacher evaluation and accountability systems.121 Between 2009 and
2012, thirty-six states and the District of Columbia passed laws
mandating that districts evaluate teachers based on their students
standardized test scores.122 Some states went so far as to mandate
117. See Sawchuk, supra note 114, at 14.
118. Id.
119. Katharine B. Stevens, Tenured Teacher Dismissal in New York: Education Law
§ 3020-a Disciplinary Procedures and Penalties3 (Am. Enter. Inst., Working Paper No. 2014-
1, 2014) ([T]he current system ... prioritiz[es] the rehabilitation of ineffective teachers over
ensuring adequate teaching for children.).
120. See SEAN P. CORCORAN, ANNENBERG INST. FOR SCH. REFORM, CAN TEACHERS BE
EVALUATED BY THEIR STUDENTS TEST SCORES? SHOULD THEY BE? THE USE OF VALUE-ADDED
MEASURES OF TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 2-3 (2010), http://annenberg
institute.org/pdf/valueAddedReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9TZ-WZBM] (discussing teacher
evaluation at the time and the general policy); EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EDUCATIONAL
IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 4 (2009), https://www.white
house.gov/assets/documents/DPC_Education_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J23-RJEB] (find-
ing $33 billion in states education budget shortfalls); id. at 4-6 (discussing the use of funds
to prompt states to improve teaching and high quality assessments).
121. See U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., supra note 112, at 2; U.S. DEPT OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY
1, 3 (2012), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-flexibility/index.html [https://perma.cc/
N9LK-54LH] (conditioning NCLB waivers on states developing assessments that would
measure student growth, and implementing teacher and principal evaluation and support
systems that ... meaningfully differentiate [teacher] performance).
122. Benjamin Michael Superfine, The Promises and Pitfalls of Teacher Evaluation and
Accountability Reform, 17 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 591, 592-93 (2014). The extent to which the
evaluations count in a teachers overall evaluation or rating vary from the vague requirement
that evaluations be a significant factor to the requirement that they count for at least 50
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specific consequences for specific test score results, such as stripping
a teacher of tenure or dismissing an untenured teacher who fell be-
low expectations in consecutive years.123
These new statutory frameworks for evaluating teachers have
come in two varieties. The firstvalue-added models (VAMs)
estimates how a class of students would perform on standardized
exams if all things were equal and attempts to determine whether
individual teachers helped their students achieve better or worse
scores than the estimate.124 The second varietystudent growth
percentile models (SGPs)measures the actual growth that a
classroom demonstrates on standardized tests and ranks that
growth in comparison to other classrooms.125
While these models have the allure of objectivity, precision, and
accuracy, scholars have highlighted serious problems in both their
theoretical constructs and practical implementation. In practical
terms, standardized exams must be designed for the models in
which they operate, but current exams were not designed with this
modeling in mind.126 They were designed as rough measures of
aggregate student knowledge, not individual teaching effective-
ness.127 Even worse, many teachers receive VAM and SGP ratings
during years in which the teachers subject was not even tested on
a standardized exam.128 In other words, the models and exams are
not reliable and valid measures of teaching effectiveness.129
percent. Bruce D. Baker et al., The Legal Consequences of MandatingHigh Stakes Decisions
Based on Low Quality Information: Teacher Evaluation in the Race-to-the-Top Era, 21 EDUC.
POLY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 3-4 (2013).
123. See NATL COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 112, at 15-22; see, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-203 (West 2014); LA. STAT. ANN. § 17:442(C)(1) (2012); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 49-5-504 (West 2015).
124. Baker et al., supra note 122, at 7.
125. Id. at 7-8.
126. Id. at 9; see also Superfine, supra note 122, at 607.
127. See Superfine, supra note 122, at 608-09.
128. See, e.g., Brief of Education Law and Educational Measurement Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs at 5-6, Cook v. Stewart, No. 14-12506-BB (11th Cir. Oct. 15,
2014); Amended Complaint at 40, Martinez v. State, No. D-101-CV-2014-00793 (N.M. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 1, 2014); Michael Winerip, In Tennessee, Following the Rules for Evaluations off a
Cliff, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/education/tennessees-
rules-on-teacher-evaluations-bring-frustration.html [https://perma.cc/U2LC-XF38].
129. See generally Dan Goldhaber et al., Does the Model Matter?Exploringthe Relationship
Between Different Student Achievement-Based Teacher Assessments 4 (Ctr. for Educ. Data &
Research, Working Paper No. 2012-6, 2012).
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The fact that many teachers ratings have varied drastically from
one year to the next provides further evidence of this problem.130
Some variation is expected, but the level of variation appears in-
dicative of flawed modeling, incomplete data,131 arbitrary cut-off
scores,132 and the inability of the models to account for the necessary
demographic and external variables.133 States have adopted these
models on the premise that the models can detect the causal effects
of quality teaching, but the models more likely detect environmental
factors that simply correlate with student achievement.134 Each of
the foregoing flaws also has legal relevance and raises serious ques-
tions about whether the systems are operating within the bounds of
constitutional due process.135
G. Reasons for Policy Failure
Each of the foregoing policy failures includes its own unique
explanation, but at least four overarching problems run throughout.
First is the inability to determine what actually constitutes quality
teaching or teachers.136 Is a quality teacher one who possesses cer-
tain knowledge, training, and certifications? Is a quality teacher one
who achieves particular results, and, if so, what are those results?
130. CORCORAN, supra note 120, at 26; Daniel F. McCaffrey et al., The Intertemporal
Variability of Teacher Effect Estimates, 4 EDUC. FIN. & POLY 572, 585-98 (2009); Superfine,
supra note 122, at 608.
131. See CORCORAN, supra note 120, at 20-21 (finding missing data for students, other
attributes such as mentoring, and the type of test administered can lead to large variations
in how a teacher is rated from year to year); John P. Papay, Different Tests, Different Answers:
The Stability of Teacher Value-Added Estimates Across Outcome Measures, 48 AM. EDUC. RES.
J. 163, 165-66 (2011) (finding variances depending on which test is used and when).
132. Baker et al., supra note 122, at 6.
133. Sarah Theule Lubienski & Corinna Crawford Crane, Beyond Free Lunch: Which
Family Background Measures Matter?, 18 EDUC. POLY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 3 (2010); Jesse
Rothstein, Student Sorting and Bias in Value-Added Estimation: Selection on Observables
and Unobservables, 4 EDUC. FIN. & POLY 537, 538 (2009); see also AM. INST. RESEARCH, 2011-
2012 GROWTH MODEL FOR EDUCATOR EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT: FINAL 5, 8 (2012),
https://www.engageny.org/sites/default/files/resource/attachments/growth-model-11-12-air-
technical-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9P5-QSXQ].
134. See Black, supra note 7, at 81.
135. See id. at 78-81.
136. Goldhaber, supra note 34, at 167 (explaining that the inability of pre-service creden-
tials to accurately predict teacher quality logically explains why policymakers are exploring
teacher workforce policy reforms).
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Or is a quality teacher an elusive concept because quality teaching
primarily occurs when competent people are given the opportunity
to teach under conducive conditions? Social scientists and policy
analysts would disagree as to which of these is the correct framing
of the issue, as well as to the answers to their preferred frame of
reference.137 Those seeking to rise above the debate would incorpo-
rate aspects of all of the definitions, emphasizing that a quality
teacher ... has a positive effect on student learning and development
through a combination of content mastery, command of a broad set
of pedagogic skills, and communications/interpersonal skills and
that this effect is contingent on an environment with appropriate
resources that is conducive to learning.138 One expert on teacher ef-
fectiveness goes even further and cautions against a one-size-fits-
all definition of teacher quality ... because a variety of occasions and
purposes exist for which different definitions may be appropriate.139
The second problem is that policymakers are resistant to this
holistic concept and evaluation of quality teaching. Each of the
foregoing policies, at least as implemented, is premised on the
notion of a silver bullet. In other words, if we could just shrink class
size to a specific number, certify all teachers, increase salaries
across the board, or look at test scores in evaluating and incentiviz-
ing teachers, our teaching problems would be solved. NCLBs high
quality mandate, for instance, was the only requirement states had
to meet. NCLB did absolutely nothing to address problems of low
teacher salaries, funding gaps, or other environmental factors.140
The premise of singular solutions is fundamentally flawed because
it leads to policy disenchantmenteven with good policieswhen
137. HIGHTOWER ET AL., supra note 25, at 5 ([T]here is no firm consensus ... as to exactly
what constitutes high-quality teaching or a quality teacher.).
138. Id. (quoting CTR. FOR HIGH IMPACT PHILANTHROPY, HIGH IMPACT PHILANTHROPY TO
IMPROVE TEACHING QUALITY IN THE U.S. 7 (2010)). See generally Joan E. Talbert & Milbrey
W. McLaughlin, Understanding Teaching in Context, in TEACHING FOR UNDERSTANDING:
CHALLENGES FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE 167, 193 (David K. Cohen et al. eds., 1993) (Teaching
does not take place in generic classrooms stripped of subject matter concerns or mindless of
the backgrounds, needs, and interests of the students who make up a class.).
139. GOE, supra note 77, at 2.
140. The most egregious example is in regard to teacher salaries. A general provision in the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act mandates that resources at schools receiving
federal funds be at least equal to those at other schools. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(2) (2012). But the
Act exempts teacher salaries from that calculus. Id. § 6321(c)(2)(B).
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the policies fail to cure all problems.141 This disenchantment perpet-
uates the third and fourth themes of policy churn and incomplete
commitment to existing policies.
Continually shifting policies is, in and of itself, disruptive and
harmful to the teaching workforce and educational outcomes.142 If
there is anything to which educators have objected over the past few
decades, it is policy churn and what has come to be the reform of
reform.143 Due to this policy churn, states rarely fully commit to the
new policy. Two of the most important policiesreducing class size
and raising salarieswere only partially and temporarily imple-
mented on a wide scale.144 Class sizes never shrunk to optimal levels
and were permitted to rise for politically expedient reasons.145
Similarly, teacher salaries overall have not increased to the level
necessary to make teaching competitive with other professions,146
and salaries in disadvantaged districts have not risen to the level
necessary to cause existing teachers to stay in or move to those dis-
tricts.147 In short, the foregoing themes beg for a movement away
from silver bullet theories toward comprehensive long-term
141. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. HESS, SPINNING WHEELS: THE POLITICS OF URBAN SCHOOL
REFORM 178-80 (1999). See generally TEACHER EDUCATION POLICY: NARRATIVES, STORIES, AND
CASES (Hendrik D. Gideonse ed., 1992) (describing numerous teaching policy reforms and the
conflicts that arose from them leading to eventual reform or abandoning the policies alto-
gether).
142. DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW
TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION 224-25 (2010).
143. See, e.g., HESS, supra note 141, at 178-80. See generally Dan Goldhaber et al., Teacher
Attitudes About Compensation Reform: Implications for Reform Implementation, 64 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 441, 442 (2011) (finding widespread teacher opposition to compensation policy
reform).
144. GALE F. GAINES, S. REGL EDUC. BD., FOCUS ON TEACHER PAY AND INCENTIVES: RECENT
LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS AND UPDATE ON SALARY AVERAGES 5-6 (2007), http://publications.sreb.
org/2007/07s03_teacher_pay.pdf [https://perma.cc/42WC-WYZM]; DOUGLAS D. READY,CLASS-
SIZE REDUCTION: POLICY, POLITICS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUITY 18 (2008), http://www.
equitycampaign.org/i/a/document/6863_Ready_Class_Size_Research_Review.pdf [https://
perma.cc/75W3-8NDS].
145. READY, supra note 144, at 18.
146. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Building a Profession of Teaching, in BACK TO THE
FUTURE: LEGACIES, CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY, PRACTICE AND RE-
SEARCH 3, 5 (Maria Assunção Flores et al. eds., 2013); Ingersoll & Merrill, supra note 24, at
193.
147. Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin, supra note 92, at 350-51 (10 percent salary increase neces-
sary for each increase of 10 percent in minority student enrollment); Loeb, Darling-Hammond
& Luczak, supra note 92, at 46-47.
1626 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1597
solutions. The legislative process, however, is generally not condu-
cive toward those ends. The remainder of this Article demonstrates
how school finance decisions have proven inept in many of the same
respects, but theorizes that the current constitutional challenge to
tenure offers lessons that suggest courts have the capacity to break
the cycle.
II. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION: IGNORING AND OVERSIMPLIFYING
THE CHALLENGES OF ACCESS TO QUALITY TEACHERS
Plaintiffs have brought school equality or adequacy claims in
nearly every state in the country and have secured victories in more
than half.148 This litigation has generated a sizeable body of prece-
dentmore than one hundred opinions from state supreme courts
alone.149 These opinions cover the structure of education, major
resource demands, and student outcomes from top to bottom. The
cases cover so much detailed information about educational quality,
outcomes, inputs, funding, and accountability that courts and
scholars have overlooked what the cases often do not address: teach-
ers. A review of the supreme court decisions from the twenty-six
states in which plaintiffs have won reveals that the word teacher
does not even appear in a substantial percentage of cases.150 This
glaring omission is repeated over and over in some states, with
litigants reaching their states highest court multiple times without
the court saying anything about teachers.151 With the exception of
just two states,152 those high court opinions that do address teachers
offer almost no indication that they appreciate the challenge of de-
livering consistent and equal access to quality teachers.
Courts, of course, have no obligation to discuss teachers. Either
explicitly or implicitly, school funding is the primary issue in many
148. Rebell, supra note 16, at 1500.
149. In some states, such as New York, the supreme court is technically not the highest
court. Supreme court is used in the text simply for ease of reference.
150. See, e.g., Montoy v. State, 62 P.3d 228 (Kan. 2003); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995).
151. The worst examples are in Texas, New York, and Arkansas. See DuPree v. Alma Sch.
Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983) (one time); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535
(S.C. 1999) (mentioned only once).
152. See infra Part II.C.
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cases, not how that money is or should be spent. Thus, courts do not
necessarily discuss other substantive aspects of education to the ex-
clusion of teachers. Yet teacher salaries are by far the largest single
item of education budgets. They consume around 80 percent of
school expenditures.153 This fact alone makes it hard to consider
education financing without also considering teachers. Moreover, as
courts regularly acknowledge or emphasize, teachers are a key com-
ponent of education, if not the most important.154 Nonetheless, even
when teachers are discussed, the analysis rarely moves beyond ba-
sic inequalities to an analysis commensurate with the importance
and complexity of ensuring teacher quality.
The following Sections represent the results of a comprehensive
review of high court decisions in which plaintiffs won, although
some lower court decisions are discussed for further context. Losses
are not included because no teacher remedy or analysis would have
been in order. A review of the victories reveals four different re-
sponses to the issue of teachers: avoidance, oversimplification,
flawed analysis, and focused attention. The first three categories
consume nearly the entirety of the case law, with the fourth repre-
senting the outliers. Section A identifies and evaluates the first two
categories of cases, as both categories are devoid of substantive
analysis of teachers. Section B offers a detailed analysis of those
court opinions that have offered some substantive discussion of
teachers but whose discussion is either limited or flawed. Section C
identifies the few outlier cases that have analyzed teachers at
length and explains why they are outliers. Reviewing all four cat-
egories of opinions, Section D offers a holistic analysis of school
finance precedent regarding teachers, identifying exactly how the
litigation has failed to produce the teacher improvements that were
presumably part of the motivation of many cases in the first in-
stance. Section E explains why courts must deepen their analysis of
teachers and identifies the issues that they must recognize. The
153. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d 518, 540 (Wyo. 2001) [here-
inafter Campbell II].
154. See, e.g., Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tenn. 1995) [here-
inafter Small Schools II] ([T]eachers, obviously, are the most important component of any
education plan.).
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Section, however, also cautions against courts exceeding their sepa-
ration of powers constraints.
A. Courts that Ignore Teachers or Treat Them as Just One of
Many Factors
At one extreme of school finance precedent are those courts that
do not even include the word teacher in their opinions. A substan-
tial portion of the decisions surveyed fall in this category. The next
and largest group discusses teachers, but only in general or simplis-
tic ways that recognize a problem but underestimate its nature and
the complexity of remedying it.155 For instance, between 1995 and
2005, the Texas Supreme Court issued four school finance opin-
ions.156 The word teacher appeared a few times in those opinions,
but only in the context of discussing macrolevel financial alloca-
tions.157 Not until 2005 did the court note how teachers fit into the
overall equation of delivering an equitable or quality education.158
Even then, the discussion was limited to a few short sentences of
generalities.159
Courts in other states mention teachers more frequently, but still
do not assign them significant analytical importance. The most com-
mon approach is simply to list and discuss teachers as one of the
several factors that relate to the delivery of a constitutionally re-
quired education.160 These courts, in effect, reduce teachers to part
155. See, e.g., DuPree, 651 S.W.2d 90; Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744 (N.H.
2002).
156. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005); W.
Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. 2003); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. McKinney, 936 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. 1996); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1995).
157. See Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 806; McKinney, 936 S.W.2d at 283-84.
158. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 805.
159. Id.
160. See DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Ohio 2000) (An efficient system is one
in which each and every school district in the state has an ample number of teachers, sound
buildings, ... and equipment sufficient for all students to be afforded an educational oppor-
tunity.); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 742 (Ohio 1997) ([A]ppellant school districts were
starved for funds, lacked teachers, buildings, and equipment, and had inferior educational
programs.); Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 787-90 (listing teachers as just one of eleven bulleted
problems across several pages of text); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979)
(briefly discussing teachers).
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of a checklist for establishing a constitutional violation.161 These
courts are correct that their education systems are struggling with
securing appropriate numbers of qualified teachers. But teaching
challenges are both more important and more difficult to resolve
than the other factors alongside which they are listed. Rather than
develop this point, the most that these courts do is conceptualize
teachers as part of the evidence one must produce to demonstrate
the existence of unequal or inadequate education.162 They do little
to explore exactly why the inadequacy or inequality in regard to
teachers exists or what the state might do to remedy it. They as-
sume that money alone will resolve the problem, just as it would
with decrepit facilities, outdated computers, or undersupplied li-
braries.
For instance, if class sizes are too bigwhich they often are
courts and/or litigants suggest it is only because schools lack the
funding to hire more teachers.163 Likewise, if teachers are insuffi-
ciently qualified in a district, it is because the district lacks the
money to attract better candidates.164 Or if teacher hiring and
retention is a problem, it is because higher salaries in other districts
are attracting teachers away or salaries are just too low as a general
principle.165 This approach reduces inadequate teaching or teachers
161. Connecticut lists teachers as just one of thirteen potential components of suitable
educational opportunity. Conn. Coal. for Justice in Educ. Funding v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 212
(Conn. 2010).
162. See McDuffy v. Secy of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 520-21 (Mass. 1993)
(parties simply stipulating to facts about teachers); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 399 (N.J.
1990) ([T]eacher ratios, experience, and education consistently improve as the districts
property wealth, per pupil expenditure, socioeconomic status or other similar factor
improves.). 
163. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (Plaintiffs contend that such
inequalities arise from great variations in per-pupil expenditures from district to district.);
Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 261 (N.D. 1994) (Those districts have
substantially higher revenues per pupil and provide their children with substantially more
favorable teacher ratios.); DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 744 (noting that many districts lack
sufficient funds to meet the states class size requirements).
164. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 252; Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 91 S.W.3d 232, 234-
35 (Tenn. 2002) [hereinafter Small Schools III]; Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 215 v. State, 219 P.3d
941, 949 (Wash. 2009).
165. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 498-99 (Ark. 2002) (noting
that [w]ell-paid and well-motivated teachers are what make the education engine run, but
that they are not paid equally across the state); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
S.W.2d 186, 198 (Ky. 1989) ([T]here is great disparity in the poor and the more affluent
school districts with regard to classroom teachers pay.); McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227
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to just a symptom of the larger fundamental flaws in the states
school funding system, rather than recognizing teaching issues as
independently significant problems.166 As subsequent Sections dem-
onstrate, this understanding is incorrect.
B. Courts that Analyze Teachers but Misunderstand Them
To their credit, a small but substantial number of courts go
beyond the basics of teacher inequality and inadequacy. They im-
plicitly recognize that understanding and solving these problems are
not easy. The opinions acknowledge the teacher pipeline, the local
teacher market, and real-world cost issues. But they still fail to
appreciate the full complexities of these issues. Most notably, they
fail to account fully for how the local teacher market interacts with
larger labor market forces, how structural issues of race and poverty
interfere with the normal functioning of the market, and how both
economic and noneconomic factors affect the pipeline into the teach-
ing profession.
1. Ignoringthe Teacher Pipeline
The pipeline into teaching and the states connection to it has
arisen in a few cases in the context of teacher certification.167 These
courts explicitly or implicitly acknowledge that a pipeline into the
teaching profession exists, but they do not necessarily hold the state
accountable for how it manages the pipeline overall. The best ex-
ample may be a trial court opinion from North Carolina that
extensively analyzed the certification process and its effects on the
supply of qualified teachers.168 The certification process was so
(Wash. 2012) ([T]he State consistently underfunded staff salaries and benefits.); Pauley v.
Gainer, 353 S.E.2d 318, 323 (W. Va. 1986) (writing that earlier decision had required that
the pay of the teachers be equalized and thereby upgraded).
166. See, e.g., Md. Bd. of Educ. v. Bradford, 875 A.2d 703, 708 (Md. 2005) ([T]he States
failure to provide adequate funding to the City impacted its ability to recruit, support, and
retain teachers and to maintain its physical facilities.). 
167. See Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *29-39
(N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 170-71 (S.C.
2014).
168. Hoke Cty., 2000 WL 1639686, at *29-39.
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rigorous that it restricted the supply of teachers in the state.169 The
court was tasked with justifying or remedying this process. The
court held that the process, although limiting the number of avail-
able teachers, was an appropriate safeguard for teacher quality, not
an impediment to it.170
This analysis is important in that it represents a court recog-
nizing and analyzing the role the state might play in the teacher
pipeline. Nonetheless, the court failed to push the analysis far
enough. The state affects or can affect the pipeline in numerous
other ways. That the state is properly managing the pipeline
through the certification process says little of what the state is doing
to manage the pipeline overall. As subsequent Sections will demon-
strate, ensuring a sufficient pipeline of teachers in terms of quality
and quantity requires the state to do far more.171 A discussion of this
broader pipeline, however, is almost entirely missing from the case
law.
Disregarding the teacher pipeline as a point of focus itself may be
defensible. The teacher pipeline might be more efficiently expanded
by increasing the incentives at the end of the pipeline. Building
pipelines is not necessarily easy and not always effective in the
short- or long-term if the back-end incentives remain small. On the
other hand, with sufficient financial incentives in the labor market
itself, pipelines may build themselves. In other words, markets are
arguably what matter most in regard to the teacher workforce. As
later Sections point out, however, the search for silver bullets or
what matters most is problematic when it is to the exclusion of hol-
istic solutions.
2. Oversimplifyingthe TeachingLabor Market
Some courts acknowledge that market forces operate on the
teaching profession, but, as with the pipeline, they do very little to
engage with or fully account for those forces.172 A few courts
169. Id. at *35 (citation omitted).
170. Id. at *29-39.
171. See Hancock v. Commr of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1168-69 (Mass. 2005) (Greaney, J.,
dissenting).
172. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 333-34 (N.Y. 2003)
[hereinafter CFE II] (recognizing labor market issues but not addressing any remedy or direct
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conceptualize the market as one primarily in which school districts
within a state compete with one another for the existing supply of
teachers in the state, potentially with some ancillary competition
along the states borders.173 These courts are assuming a healthy
teaching market with an adequate supply of teachers in which some
districts outcompete others within the state.174
This localized, interdistrict understanding of the teaching mar-
ket is flawed on multiple levels. The teacher market is influenced by
other macro and micro forces, which can be more important than
the interdistrict competition within a state. First, the teaching
profession transcends local borders and regions. At the earliest
decision-making point, high school students who are considering or
intend to enter the teaching market may cross state borders to
attend collegeafter which they may or may not choose to return to
their homes after graduation.175 Second, students decisions are
influenced not only by local conditions, but also by their perception
of the profession in general. Third, teacher shortages are a national
phenomenon, not one isolated in particular states or communities.176
This national shortage is influenced by multiple factors, including
response to them).
173. See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Ark. 2004) (focusing
on trying to control the migration of teachers from one intrastate area to another or to contig-
uous states); Small Schools III, 91 S.W.3d 232, 234-35 (Tenn. 2002) (analyzing the rural
teacher market against the urban market); Campbell II, 19 P.3d 518, 540 (Wyo. 2001) (ana-
lyzing competitive markets).
174. The highest court in New York, for instance, ignored how inequality creates an un-
healthy teacher market and indicated that the constitution requires only access to adequate
teachers, not teachers of equal quality. CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 333-34.
175. See LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 48-49 (finding new teachers preferred to
work close to their hometown); Boyd et al., supra note 23, at 71 (same).
176. Campbell II, 19 P.3d at 543 (acknowledging a national teacher shortage); Tom Chor-
neau, Have Millenials Turned Away from TeachingProfession?, CABINET REP. (June 29, 2015),
https://www.cabinetreport.com/human-resources/have-millenials-turned-away-from-teaching-
profession [https://perma.cc/LZ62-RKTX]; Research Spotlight on Recruiting& RetainingHigh-
ly Qualified Teachers, NATL EDUC. ASSN, http://www.nea.org/tools/17054.htm [https://perma.
cc/UTC9-6B6Q] (last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (finding a shrinking teacher force).
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the perception of the profession in general177 and the national, re-
gional, and local market for teachers.178
Fourth and potentially most important, at each of these market
levels, the teaching market cannot be isolated from the overall labor
market. The salaries and job opportunities outside of teaching exert
pressure on both entry to and exit from the profession as a whole.179
Thus, schools are not just competing with one another in or out of
the state; they are competing with private industry and other pro-
fessions in and out of the state.180 Each market will have reciprocal
effects on the others. None of this is to suggest that individual states
can easily control or influence the teaching market. They cannot.181
But states, and the courts prompting them to act, must appreciate
how the market really operates if they have any realistic expec-
tation of affecting it. To look only at local interdistrict competition
may do nothing more than rob district Peter to pay district Paul.
Appreciating these market forces is important because they
control the appropriate salary structure for teachers in any given
school district and the necessary state funding scheme to support it.
Flaws in conceptualizing the appropriate teaching and labor market
lead to a flawed cost analysis for securing quality teacher labor.
States and courts, at best, project appropriate base teacher sal-
aries founded on local differences in cost of living.182 The larger
competitive pressures on the profession, however, would indicate
177. GORDON ET AL., supra note 32, at 26 (finding that talented individuals do not pursue
education careers because it is perceived as not challenging); Hamilton Lankford et al., Who
Enters Teaching?EncouragingEvidence that the Status of TeachingIs Improving, 43 EDUC.
RESEARCHER 444, 444 (2014) (finding people are deterred from entering the profession due to
the professions low status).
178. See, e.g., Boyd et al., supra note 23, at 73-74 (explaining differences in salaries contrib-
ute to the sorting of teachers across regions and districts); Sipple & Brent, supra note 74, at
611-12 (finding that teachers tend to seek employment in urban versus rural areas).
179. See LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at ii (finding that teachers are more likely to
pursue a career as a teacher when starting teacher wages are high relative to wages in other
occupations); Ingersoll & Merrill, supra note 24, at 187.
180. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 22, 110; LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73,
at 18 ([A]s job opportunities have opened up for female college graduates in occupations
outside of teaching, the teacher workforce has lost some of its highest scoring teachers.).
181. As discussed in Part II.E.1, market forces are sufficiently powerful that districts
themselves cannot counteract them, and it is not necessarily the case that one state alone can
either, depending on its position in the market.
182. In Kansas, the legislature had perpetrated this exact flaw. See Montoy v. State, 112
P.3d 923, 934-35 (Kan. 2005).
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that locality costs may have little relation to the salaries necessary
to attract and retain quality teachers.183 In other words, a locality-
based approach may help teachers afford groceries and houses in
cities as easily as they could in counties, but it may not significantly
affect the decision of whether to become and stay a teacher.
Both the market and cost analysis also largely fail to consider
fundamental problems of racial and socioeconomic segregation in
schools, which help structure the market itself and the cost of
counteracting its tendencies. In many respects, inadequate teaching
is a distributional problem rather than an absolute shortage prob-
lem.184 The least qualified teachers are clustered in predominantly
poor and minority schools.185 This clustering is a result of both
teachers entry-level job selection decisions and subsequent exit
decisions.186 In both instances, the most highly qualified teachers
prefer to teach elsewhere.187 Teacher salaries, at least at current lev-
els, do not necessarily play a significant role in interrupting these
distributional patterns.188 In short, even a sophisticated market does
not fully account for the challenge of equitable distributions of
teachers, unless it also accounts for other noneconomic structural
forces relating to race and poverty. Locality costs alone surely over-
simplify these dynamics, as do the small pay boosts that some
183. See JAY CHAMBERS & WILLIAM J. FOWLER, JR., PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER COST
DIFFERENCES ACROSS THE UNITED STATES, at xix (1995) (finding there are important factors
beyond the cost of living that should be considered in teacher recruitment and retention);
DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 40 (explaining that working conditions are at least as
powerful as salaries in recruitment and retention).
184. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 27, at 1-2; Boyd et al., supra note 23, at 59.
185. See EDUC. TR., supra note 29, at 2; Adamson & Darling-Hammond, supra note 73, at
24 fig.7 (finding that the rate of teachers with only a Bachelor of Arts or lower degree, with
less than three years of experience, and without credentials, was nearly double in high-
poverty districts as compared to high-wealth districts in California).
186. See Boyd et al., supra note 23, at 57.
187. Id. (Teachers in schools with low-achieving students chose to move to higher-achiev-
ing schools, leaving many high-poverty districts with vacancies and unqualified instruction.); 
Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin, supra note 92, at 343 (finding that experienced teachers moved to
high-socioeconomic status schools when positions were available).
188. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 40 (emphasizing the importance of working
conditions); DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 27, at 2 (finding that teacher preference to teach
in schools with more high-achieving and wealthy students may be due to the added benefit
of better facilities or more preparation time).
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localities have offered to recruit teachers to less desirable areas or
schools.189
C. The Outliers: Courts that Focus on Teachers
Of all the school finance cases litigated, only two came close to
analyzing fully the challenge of adequately staffing schools with
quality teachers. Those casesin Tennessee and Wyomingpro-
duced several trips to the supreme and lower courts in each state.190
These two states defy the overall rule most likely because the cases
were the only ones to focus almost exclusively on teachers. In fact,
in several of the decisions, teachers were the only issue before the
court. This laser-like focus prevented the myriad issues surrounding
teachers from being obscured by other nonteacher issues.
In Tennessee, the reoccurring issue for the supreme court was
whether the states evolving funding formula properly accounted for
the cost of compensating teachers.191 Across these decisions, the
court consistently reiterated that minimum statewide salaries were
insufficient, teacher salaries must be cost-driven like any other as-
pect of the budget, and competing for teachers means not just com-
peting with other districts but competing with other professions
outside of teaching.192 In all these respects, the court emphasized
that the ultimate question must be whether teacher compensation
is sufficient to ensure equal educational opportunity for students,
not whether it provides equal compensation for teachers.193
The Wyoming Supreme Court went even further. The court was
forced to analyze competing statistical analyses of differing funding
schemes to determine how they would affect class size and average
189. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 489-90 (Ark. 2002)
(finding the problem goes beyond salary); see also DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 27, at 3
([S]alary incentives to attract teachers to hard-to-staff schools ... ha[ve] had mixed success.).
190. Small Schools III, 91 S.W.3d 232, 233 (Tenn. 2002); Campbell II, 19 P.3d 518, 518
(Wyo. 2001). Although on a much smaller scale, the New Jersey Supreme Court also engaged
in a uniquely analytic evaluation of the struggle to hire teachers in a pre-K program that was
competing with the federal head start program. See Abbott v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842, 852-54
(N.J. 2002).
191. Small Schools III, 91 S.W.3d at 233-34.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 233-43; Small Schools II, 894 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tenn. 1995); Tenn. Small Sch.
Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 143-44 (Tenn. 1993) [hereinafter Small Schools I].
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teacher salaries.194 The state posited, for instance, that where hous-
ing costs were the highest, other amenities [would] exist to offset
the need for higher salaries.195 Because those amenities would make
the areas more desirable, raising compensation for teachers in
those districts would overcompensate them.196 The trial court had
rejected the states funding scheme, conclud[ing] that regional cost-
of-living adjustments were appropriate but the modified index was
inappropriate [and] did not accurately reflect the actual disparity in
the cost of hiring teachers in various locations throughout the
state.197 The court also questioned the efficacy of relying on past
expenditures in school districts to determine the actual cost of
delivering an adequate education, indicating that it is far prefera-
ble to rely on methods that go shopping for teachers, which in-
volve[s] determining salary and other compensation rates for
professionals with training and experience comparable to teachers,
counselors, administrators, etc., [and] wage rates for classifications
of employee skills utilized by school districts.198
The court also acknowledged the fluidity of the market. Because
this shopping market is subject to continual change like any other
market, the state must regularly reevaluate the market and adjust
its funding schemes accordingly.199 For instance, one-third of current
teachers in Wyoming would become retirement-eligible by the year
2004, significantly fewer graduates [would] seek[ ] teaching posi-
tions, and the aggressive recruitment of Wyoming teachers by other
states offering considerably higher salaries and benefits was al-
ready underway.200 The unavoidable coming market changes
required the state to be proactive:
The legislature does not have the luxury of waiting until the
crisis fully materializes before taking the action necessary to
remain viably competitive regionally and nationally.
....
194. Campbell II, 19 P.3d at 530.
195. Id. at 534.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 537.
199. Id. at 543.
200. Id.
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Because teacher quality is critical to providing a constitu-
tional education and all parties recognize the looming national
problem of a teacher shortage, the legislature is also directed to
monitor the supply of qualified teachers and take appropriate
action should national conditions continue to worsen to the
detriment of Wyoming schools. It is unacceptable for essential
teaching positions to remain unfilled or to be consistently filled
by unqualified applicants.201
None of the foregoing, however, is to suggest Tennessee or Wyo-
ming as model. Although both courts certainly addressed nuances
that most other courts ignore, they still did not fully account for
some of the relevant market, professional, structural, and racial
challenges discussed in regard to other states. For instance, a
shopping theory in Wyoming would work only if one accounts for
and counteracts buyer and seller biases. The same is true for
Tennessees demand that salaries be cost-based in regard to other
professions. And neither state does much to engage the teacher
pipeline. The point here is simply that only two courts of all those
that have intervened in educational adequacy and equality have
seriously addressed teachers, but even these courts should have
gone further.
D. Assessingthe Effect of School Finance Remedies on Teachers
The failure to specifically analyze teachers or certain aspects of
securing equal access to them does not necessarily mean school
finance litigation has had no meaningful impact. Changes in school
funding that add to the bottom line of education budgets will almost
necessarily affect teacher salaries. And changes in teacher salaries
will presumably have some effect, even if minor, on the teaching
labor market. Keenly aware of this practical reality, teachers and
teacher unions have been heavily involved in funding and pushing
litigation in several states.202 Of all the additional revenue secured
through this litigation, 34 to 45 percent has been directed to teacher
201. Id. at 543, 550.
202. See, e.g., Michael Podgursky, Is Teacher Pay Adequate?, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS:
THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY 131, 149 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson
eds., 2007); Kevin Rothstein, FundingAdvocate Puts Money Where Her Mouth Is, BOS. HER-
ALD, April 27, 2004, at 5, 2004 WLNR 399352.
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wages.203 On average, this amounts to a 4 percent pay increase for
each teacher or about $1200 in additional annual salary.204
David Simss detailed analysis of these salary increases, however,
confirms that obfuscating teacher issues has not produced meaning-
ful reforms.205 In some situations, the problems that gave rise to the
constitutional violations in the first instance have remained or rep-
licated. Across-the-board 4 percent raises are so small that they do
almost nothing to change the general attractiveness of the profes-
sion.206 Thus, these raises ultimately fail to change the labor market
in any meaningful way.
Had states concentrated these funds on salary increases for cer-
tain categories of teachers, they would have had a greater chance of
meaningfully impacting the profession or certain students access to
existing teachers. For instance, Sims writes that:
[S]ome of the salary increases may be intended to attract more
talent to the teaching profession over time or to retain more
teachers in their early years (when attrition is very high).
Hence, the increase in salaries is paying for an increase in
teacher productivity. Empirically, if this were the case salaries
of less experienced teachers should increase in proportion to
those of their senior colleagues who have less mobility hazard.
We might also expect the initial salaries for teachers to increase
to attract better applicants.207
But the data again reveals that this has not been the case. The sal-
aries of newer teachers have not risen and may have even fallen in
some instances.208
The salary increases for school finance litigation have been
funneled through existing salary structures that may even be coun-
terproductive or wasteful. These existing salary structures place a
premium on experience, and, thus, funneling salary increases
203. Sims, supra note 98, at 1043.
204. Id. at 1041-42 (These results make it clear that plaintiff victories in finance lawsuits
lead to higher teacher wages and more teaching personnel, as well as higher maintenance and
support spending.).
205. Id. at 1042.
206. See LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 53-54.
207. Sims, supra note 98, at 1042.
208. Id.
2016] TAKING TEACHER QUALITY SERIOUSLY 1639
through them drives the largest increases to senior teachers.209 In
effect, teachers who have been in place the longest and are not
planning to leave are the most likely to receive the largest salary
increases. Sims refers to this as rent[ ] capture[ ].210 The state
increases the inputs but does not secure a change in outputs.211 In
the context of constitutional claims, this means that the state is not
securing additional teaching quality or remedying the problems that
produced inadequate or unequal educational opportunities in the
first instance.
Even with the preference for experience, states could have used
the salary increases to drive experienced teachers toward high-need
schools. This allocation could assist in the redistribution of existing
teachers, even if it did not change the profession overall. But Simss
work, in conjunction with others, would again indicate that this
redistribution of teachers has not occurred.212 The funds at stake are
simply too small to address the fundamental problems at hand.
Based on his analysis of those fundamental problems, Gregory
Gilpin calculates that an increase in permanent income of $19,241
for math/science teachers and $9,717 for humanities teachers to
teach in unfavorable schools may equalize teacher quality across
schools.213 But nothing even approaching that order of magnitude
has been available for high-need schools and districts.
E. Why Courts Must Deepen Their Analysis of Teachers
That courts have failed to engage in substantial analysis of teach-
ers in the past does not answer the question of why they should
now. One might posit that teachers are already at the center of the
litigation, even if not discussed at length. As noted above, teacher
salaries are by far the largest single item of education budgets.214
Thus, school finance litigation, regardless of what is written in an
opinion, is ultimately about teachers. Moreover, most courts identify
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., id.
213. Gilpin, supra note 89, at 25.
214. See, e.g., Campbell II, 19 P.3d 518, 530 (Wyo. 2001) (Over 80 percent of the school dis-
trict costs are for personnel, primarily classroom teachers.).
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teachers as a key component of a constitutional education, if not the
most important component.215 Sophisticated or not, New Yorks
highest court, for instance, flatly stated, [t]he first and surely most
important input is teaching.216
Neither recognizing the importance of teachers nor their dom-
inant effect on school budgets is enough. Inadequacies and inequali-
ties in teaching, although interconnected with overall funding
problems, are not merely symptoms of funding problems. And even
if teacher challenges were only symptoms of inadequate funding,
they are sufficiently important and idiosyncratic that they demand
their own immediate attention. For instance, hunger and malnutri-
tion are undoubtedly symptoms of poverty, but their importance
dictates that we address these symptoms regardless of whether we
address poverty. In other words, teachers have independent signif-
icance apart from funding inequality in general. Thus, courts must
carefully attend to the issue of teachers and force responsibility for
them upon the state.
The written opinions of courts are inconsistent with this care and
responsibility. Even if the primary effect of the litigation is on
teachers, it is indirect. The explicit judicial conversation, which ulti-
mately guides legislatures in complying with judicial directives, is
not about teachers. To speak of reforming education without directly
engaging the complexities of teacher quality is to obfuscate the
importance of teachers, to leave students access to quality teachers
entirely subject to a market that does not work to their benefit, and
to trust that states will do what they have thus far refused to do.
Equally important, a conversation about school finances that as-
sumes money will indirectly solve the problem of teaching quality
entirely ignores evidence that indicates teachers do not just want
more money.217 The profession and environment in which they work
matter as much as money.218 Subsections 1 through 4 explore these
points further to explain why courts must substantively engage the
215. See, e.g., Small Schools II, 894 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tenn. 1995) (explaining that [t]each-
ers, obviously, are the most important component of any education plan and that their
compensation is the major item in every education budget).
216. CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 333 (N.Y. 2003).
217. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 40-41.
218. Id.
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topic of teachers. Subsection 5 responds to the potential argument
that courts would be exceeding their authority if they did so.
1. Market Forces Are Too Complexand Powerful for Individual
Districts to Counteract
As introduced in prior Sections, securing quality teachers in ade-
quate numbers involves complex market issues. Money certainly
matters in this market, but how much, when, and where is not ob-
vious. First, the cost analysis that works for facilities, computers,
buses, and other tangible resources is ill-adapted to teachers.
Teachers cannot simply be produced or procured through commer-
cial outlets. This factor alone dictates that courts should engage in
a type of analysis and remedy distinct from that most often found in
school finance precedent. Courts surely are not entirely ignorant of
these obvious points. They err, however, in assuming or trusting
that additional funding or more equitable distributions of funding
will adequately address teaching quality and shortages.
Second, individual school districts cannot control the teaching
market on their own. School finance claims often speak of local
districts inability to exercise discretion and control over the educa-
tional opportunities they provide.219 The premise is that the poorest
districts could exercise the same control and discretion as wealthier
ones if the state would only support them properly.220 But very few,
if any, school districts have the power to counteract or control the
market on their own. The markets flawsnot a schools ability to
participate in itare the primary problem. For instance, funding
increases that improve some districts ability to compete with other
districts leave fundamental problems in place if the increases are
insufficient to prompt a change in the overall supply of quality
teachers in the market. Equalizing competitive power between
districts may just cause a rearrangement of existing teachers within
a state and shift the problem to another district or equally distrib-
ute the problem. But the more likely response is that wealthier
districts will strike back economically to prevent the loss of their
219. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Horton v.
Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 367-68 (Conn. 1977).
220. See, e.g., Horton, 376 A.2d at 368.
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teachers, and disfavored districts will revert back to the same
position they held before state intervention.
It is possible, of course, that the initial action and reaction will
increase overall salaries to a level that the market for teaching ver-
sus other professions changes, but the resurfaced inequity between
districts would remain a potentially serious problem. As scholars
and some courts have pointed outthough not in the context of
teachersadequacy and equity in education are intertwined: one
can rarely exist without the other.221 Thus, there must be adequate
funding to spur a change in the overall supply of quality teachers
and be sufficiently equitable funding for all schools to compete fairly
for those quality teachers.222
One caveat is in order. The same problems that individual dis-
tricts face in controlling and participating in the teaching market
are likely to occur at the state level as well. As one state begins to
out-compete another by securing more teachers within its own
borders, it will either drive down teaching quality in another state
or prompt that state to fight back. Active and continual state-level
competition, however, is more likely to create the demand that
causes teaching quality to increase overall.223 This state-level com-
petition, moreover, reinforces the point of this Subsection: it is a
fools errand to assume that local districts can change, control, or
compete in the teaching market with only minor shifts in education
funding.
2. Race and Segregation Matter
The equity-versus-adequacy analysis of teacher salaries also re-
lates to an aspect of the market that has been discussed or alluded
to throughout this Article: access to a stable, quality teaching force
is also a distributional problem within a racially and socioeconom-
ically segregated school structure. Predominantly white, middle-
income schools have no significant problem with their workforce.224
221. See DEREK W. BLACK, EDUCATION LAW: EQUALITY, FAIRNESS, AND REFORM 205 (2013);
Weishart, supra note 22, at 525-31.
222. See generally Weishart, supra note 22.
223. Again, the principle that both adequacy and equity are necessary would operate, to
some extent, between states as well.
224. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 92-119 (finding that teachers favored
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The problem is in predominantly poor and minority schools, al-
though geographically isolated schools often struggle as well for
obvious reasons.225 School finance theory would have us believe that
if schools serving predominantly poor and minority students just
had more money, they could attract and retain better teachers.226
This is true only to some extent and depends on how much money
is at stake.
Research demonstrates that the demographic characteristics of
schools play a significant role in teachers decisions of where to
worka role so significant that it tends to overshadow money.227
Higher salary structures and extra combat pay to teach in these
schools have thus far not been able to change the distributional
patterns.228 And some would argue that raising salaries to the point
necessary to disrupt the problem would be economically ineffi-
cient.229 Regardless, individual schools and districts lack the power
to raise salaries to that point230 or to change their demographics
predominantly white schools in higher socioeconomic areas); Boyd et al., supra note 23, at 10
(finding a movement away from high poverty districts); Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin, supra note
92, at 340 (finding that experienced teachers moved to high-socioeconomic status schools).
225. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 42-51 (finding various problems in pre-
dominantly poor and minority schools, from dysfunctional hiring practices to noncompetitive
salaries); EDUC. TR., supra note 29, at 2-4.
226. See Ryan, supra note 5, at 291-93 (critiquing the school finance premise that money
alone would improve education); Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain & Steven G. Rivkin, Why
Public Schools Lose Teachers 18-20 (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8599,
2001) (concluding that higher salaries could overcome teacher reluctance to work in hard-to-
staff schools).
227. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 40 ([W]orking conditions are at least as
powerful as salaries.); Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Teacher Mobility, School Segregation, and
Pay-Based Policies to Level the PlayingField, 6 EDUC. FIN. & POL. 399, 403-04 (2011); Hanu-
shek & Rivkin, supra note 90, at 76 (finding that the demographic characteristics of suburban
schools made up for the salary decrease they experienced when transferring).
228. See Clotfelter et al., supra note 227, at 425 (finding that teachers with stronger qualif-
ications are both more responsive to the racial and socioeconomic mix of a schools students
and less responsive to salary than others). But see Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Would Higher
Salaries Keep Teachers in High-Poverty Schools?Evidence from a Policy Intervention in North
Carolina, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1352, 1363 (2008) (finding that teachers who received $1800
annually for teaching in hard-to-staff subjects and schools reduced teacher turnover rates by
roughly 17 percent).
229. Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the Constitutional
Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 390-403 (2012); Ryan, supra note 5, at 308.
230. See Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegration: All Things Are Not Equal,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 120-21 (2009) ([A] school district would have to nearly double
a teachers salary to induce the teacher to teach at a high-poverty and predominantly minority
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through nonmonetary policies.231 In short, these structural demo-
graphic challenges require state-level action that considers not just
funding policies, but also district and school organization.232
The role of race and organizational structures was clear in South
Carolinas most recent school finance case. Decades after the de-
cision in Brown v. Board of Education declared racial segregation
inherently unequal,233 the same community whose case had been
consolidated with Brown brought a school finance claim against the
State of South Carolina.234 Plaintiffs later demonstrated teacher
inequities, among others, that were nothing short of shocking.235
Although the legal claim was strictly premised on funding inade-
quacy alone, one of the plaintiffs attorneys had always asserted
that the case could not be understood outside the context of race and
that the state had consigned this current generation of students to
educational ghettos.236 The state supreme court even rhetorically
employed this language in 2014, remarking that [s]tudents in these
districts are grouped by economic class into what amounts to no
more than educational ghettos.237 But the court never moved
beyond rhetoric or assigned race any analytical importance.
It did, however, assign significance to the structures through
which education is delivered. It wrote, [t]he inputs and outputs
described ... do not exist in a vacuum, but instead against a back-
drop of ... local legislation and ... school district [structure].238
Potentially for political reasons, the court focused solely on the
administrative burden of the current district structures in the state,
school rather than elsewhere.).
231. Although demography may be largely beyond schools power, that demography
intersects with finance inequality. EDUC. TR., FUNDING GAPS 2006 (2006). Those finance ine-
qualities are directly within the states control and do drive certain teachers to certain places
early. See Boyd et al., supra note 23, at i.
232. Consider, for instance, that the greatest racial and socioeconomic segregation exists
between school districts, not within them. Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, IntegratingNeigh-
borhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat from School Desegregation in the South, 1990-
2000, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1563, 1575-80 (2003).
233. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
234. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999); see also Kristina Dell,
What Brown Means Today, TIME (May 17, 2004),http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/
0,8599,639014,00.html [https://perma.cc/4GR3-T3KQ].
235. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 171 (S.C. 2014).
236. Id. at 175.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 172.
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stopping short of examining the other structural forces at play.239 In
short, although the South Carolina Supreme Court came closest to
accounting for the larger factors affecting educational opportunity,
it fell victim to the same flaws as other courts: the overestimation
of economic factors and a disregard for noneconomic structural fac-
tors that shape educational opportunity and funding.
3. States Cannot Be Trusted to Improve Teachingfor
Disadvantaged Districts
Past school finance litigation demonstrates that states, in gener-
al, cannot be trusted to take the steps necessary to ensure adequate
access to quality teachers for disadvantaged districts. The entire
school finance and quality litigation movement has been an effort to
force states to do what they otherwise will not. There is no more
reason to believe states will deal with the complex problems of
ensuring teacher quality than there is to believe that they will
ensure equitable and adequate funding without consistent judicial
prodding. To the contrary, there may be even less reason to trust
states regarding teachers. States have proven particularly resistant
to progressive change regarding teachers, probably because changes
in teacher policies carry the most significant financial and adminis-
trative consequences.240 In fact, when litigation has most directly
raised demands with regard to teachers, it has engendered the most
resistance.
For instance, in Tennessee the plaintiffs were forced to bring the
issue of teacher salaries to the state supreme court three times in
one decade.241 The state repeatedly failed to take the basic steps
necessary to equalize salaries, even after the supreme court ordered
the state to do so.242 Likewise, while New Jerseys judiciary has been
the most active in the country in enforcing education rights, the
state has been anything but agreeable on teacher issues. The state
has consistently blamed school districts for their own plight.243 The
239. Id. at 173.
240. See Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin, supra note 92, at 350-51.
241. Small Schools I, 851 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tenn. 1993); Small Schools II, 894 S.W.2d 734,
734-35 (Tenn. 1995); Small Schools III, 91 S.W.3d 232, 232 (Tenn. 2002).
242. See, e.g., Small Schools III, 91 S.W.3d at 233-38.
243. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 386 (N.J. 1985).
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state has argued that poor management decisions in low-wealth
districts;244 teacher evaluation methods, and collective bargaining
agreements;245 and districts misguided concerns with classroom
size were the problem,246 not the states refusal to fund educational
needs.247 The state has also gone so far as to argue that variances
between districts are irrelevant to educational quality.248
While Tennessee and New Jersey may offer some of the most
egregious examples of states pushing back against securing ade-
quate access to quality teachers, the problem became evident only
because the litigants and courts pushed the state so hard to fulfill
its obligations. Without this level of aggression, other states regu-
larly take half-measures to address teaching costs, recruitment, and
retention.249 Regardless of context, the conclusion is the same: states
are unwilling, of their own volition, to acknowledge or deal with the
complexities of ensuring adequate access to quality teachers.
4. The TeachingEnvironment Matters as Much as Salary
Research shows that the environment in which teachers work and
the support that they receive matter tremendously to teachers, not
just money.250 In fact, some research indicates that teachers care
most about the quality of the teaching environment, not high sala-
ries.251 School finance remedies that focus only on budgets, with the
assumption that they will increase teacher salaries, miss this point.
Although additional funding alone could and should also affect the
244. Id.
245. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1040 (N.J. 2011).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 1025-26.
248. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403-04 (N.J. 1990). Of course, the evidence has indi-
cated otherwise, and the court has rejected such argument. Id. at 399-400.
249. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d 1, 8-9, 14-15 (Ark.
2004).
250. See LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at 46-48; Boyd et al., supra note 23, at 13-15;
Hanushek & Rivkin, supra note 90, at 82.
251. See Geoffrey D. Borman & N. Maritza Dowling, Teacher Attrition and Retention: A
Meta-Analytic and Narrative Review of the Research, 78 REV. EDUC. RES. 367, 398 (2008);
Helen F. Ladd, Teachers Perceptions of Their Working Conditions: How Predictive of Planned
and Actual Teacher Movement?, 33 EDUC. EVALUATION & POLY ANALYSIS 235, 236, 253-55
(2011).
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quality of the educational environment in which teachers work, this
is, at best, an assumption.
Only a few select courts even acknowledge the connection be-
tween the environment and teaching quality. The New Jersey
Supreme Court wrote, [l]ocal conditions, too, are telling ... insofar
as they attract or repel teachers who are free to choose one commu-
nity rather than another.252 A California trial court noted that
schools with high teacher turnover can fall into a vicious cycle in
which the high turnover itself makes it more difficult to recruit and
retain teachers, contributing to continued high turnover.253 Outside
of passing references like these, however, courts have not addressed
environmental and working conditions as a means by which to im-
prove teacher quality and retention. Environmental conditions,
instead, become one of those concerns that fade into the background
as the focus moves toward macrofunding issues. For instance, in the
same paragraph in which the New Jersey Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that local conditions matter to teaching quality, it relegated
those conditions to just one more thing that money would cure if it
were available.254
Salary and working conditions, which include support services,
facilities, class size, and the environmental climate, all interrelate.
None can be analyzed independently, nor reduced solely to issues of
funding. Funding is certainly important to each, but there is little
evidence that states understand the importance of funding for
teachers as being about the conditions under which they teach
rather than just salaries. As the superintendent of a plaintiff
district in Alaska explained, teacher turnover and hiring finally
improved in his district not because of higher salaries, but because
teachers have a sense of professional satisfaction as a result of the
positive changes [in the district].... [M]oney will not inspire a
teacher to remain teaching.255 In fact, it was a teacher mentoring
project run through the University of Alaskarather than salary
252. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 277 (N.J. 1973).
253. Reed v. State, No. BC432420, 2011 WL 10893745, at *28-29 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 8,
2011).
254. See Robinson, 303 A.2d at 277.
255. Moore v. State, No. 3AN049756, 2007 WL 8310251, at *32 (Alaska Super. Ct. June
21, 2007). This is not to suggest salaries do not matter. Other evidence in the case also indi-
cated that the district in question had the best compensation package for teachers of any
rural entity in the state. Id. at *72-73.
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structure changesthat lowered teacher turnover in participating
districts by 15 percent.256 In the absence of understanding how en-
vironmental factors and salaries relate, courts cannot assume that
states or districts, with more resources alone, will improve the edu-
cational environment in the way that matters to teachers. The more
likely inclination would be to pay teachers to work and succeed,
notwithstanding the poor environment in which they work.
F. Navigatingthe Risks of Intervention
To be clear, school finance and quality litigation cannot, nor
should it attempt to, solve all of educations ills. In fact, even when
plaintiffs secure victories, the results are mixed on the question of
whether the remedies that followed were meaningful.257 This Article
does not intend to suggest otherwise. To the contrary, opponents of
judicial engagement of teachers could offer at least three caution-
ary arguments. First, as the foregoing Sections explain, improving
student access to quality teachers is not simple or easy. Solving the
problem through litigation involves courts prompting states to im-
plement remedies that they have been unable to find themselves.
This begs the question of how courts could presume to help when
they have less expertise on education policy than the other branches
of government. Finding solutions that have evaded others would
force courts to dig deeper into the social science literature regarding
teachers and potentially make hard decisions when the evidence is
not altogether clear.
Second, courts would be reluctant to make judgment calls about
social science and education policy. They would run the risk of in-
truding on legislative discretion and raising serious separation of
power concerns. In general, school finance litigation already pushes
the bounds of separation of powers limits.258 Courts in a number of
states have rejected school equity and quality claims entirely, citing
a lack of judicially manageable standards in education, the elusive-
256. Id. at *19.
257. See SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS, supra note 202, app. at 345-58 (listing the judgments in
school finance cases); see also Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial
Review of Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA.
L. REV. 701 (2010).
258. See Bauries, supra note 257, at 743-45.
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ness of measuring educational outcomes and quality, and the need
to defer to legislative discretion in policy making.259 Even courts
that rule in favor of plaintiffs proceed cautiously in suggesting or
dictating the remedy a state must adopt.260
The most typical and conservative approach to dealing with sep-
aration of powers is for a court simply to declare the current
educational system unconstitutional without demanding a specific
remedy. At most, these courts imply an appropriate remedy through
their focus on and explanation of particular flaws in the current
scheme. Yet a court might undercut that implication by emphasiz-
ing that it is entirely the states obligation to devise a solution. Only
after repeated state recalcitrance would such courts become more
specific about remedies.261 Dictating or implying a remedy that
resolves the complex challenges of teacher quality would arguably
push courts to the outer extremes of their judicial authority and call
into question separation of power limits more than prior cases.262
Third, separation of power concerns aside, teachers existing legal
rights could potentially create barriers to certain remedies. Current
salary structures (by statute or local provision), tenure rights, and
collective bargaining agreements are likely to intersect with any
remedy a court might order.263 Due process rights and existing
contracts may place limits on certain remedies or, at the very least,
disincentivize certain remedies.264
Properly framed, however, the foregoing points are reasons why
courts should proceed carefully with teacher remedies, not justifica-
tions for ignoring and avoiding the challenge altogether. First,
teacher quality may be more complex than other issues, but it does
not pose sui generis separation of powers concerns. If teaching qual-
ity is part of a constitutional education, courts are bound to address
it. As with any other constitutional education case, it is the province
259. See, e.g., Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel
v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 166-67 (Ga. 1981).
260. See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744, 758-60 (N.H. 2002).
261. See, e.g., Campbell I, 907 P.2d 1238, 1263-64 (Wyo. 1995).
262. New York, for instance, clearly was not prepared to push the issue further and simply
lumped teachers in with monetary driven problems. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 861
N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2006) [hereinafter CFE III].
263. See Black, supra note 7 at 82-83.
264. See, e.g., Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., 441 U.S. 463, 465 (1979) (per curiam);
Balt. Teachers Union v. Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1015 (4th Cir. 1993).
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of courts to say what the law is and determine whether it has been
violated.265 When violations occur, it is also the province of courts
to order the state to remedy them.266 If multiple potential remedies
are appropriate, discretion remains with the state to choose among
them.267 But when a state fails to implement effective remedies,
states discretion can narrow. A court may respect the legislatures
wide discretion in taking the first steps toward devising and im-
plementing a remedy, but when a legislature refuses or fails to
implement an appropriate remedy, some courts will assert greater
authority, either through contempt proceedings against the state or
by ordering more specific remedies.268 At the very least, the number
of reasonable remedies within a states purview shrinks when a
court finds prior legislative remedies insufficient. In short, there is
no question that a court could intervene on issues of teachers, just
as it would with any other constitutional violation in regard to edu-
cation. The question is how a court might intervene most effectively.
Second, the foregoing Sections demonstrate that states past
efforts with regard to teacher quality have been far from sufficient.
In the past, most courts have taken an extremely deferential ap-
proach on the topic of teachers, demanding only that states expand
resources and assuming that the state could best discern how to use
those funds to improve instruction.269 The failure of these past
remedies to resolve the problem of access to quality teachers is the
basis upon which a court should now become more pointed in its
analysis of violations and remedies.
Third, courts own admonishments reveal the flaw in thinking
that simply increasing available money will resolve teacher chal-
lenges. As courts and scholars have increasingly indicated over the
265. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. for Justice v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 210, 217 (Conn. 2010); Campbell
I, 907 P.2d at 1264 ([T]he judiciary has the constitutional duty to declare unconstitutional
that which transgresses the state constitution.).
266. See, e.g., Campbell I, 907 P.2d at 1264.
267. See generally Bauries, supra note 257.
268. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1040-41 (N.J. 2011); Robinson v. Cahill, 358
A.2d 457, 459-60 (N.J. 1976) (per curiam). Although arising in the context of violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, this same general give-and-take between
the local school authorities and the federal courts was laid out in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burgBd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971).
269. See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 345, 348 (N.Y. 2003) (directing the State to reform
the current system of financing school funding so that every school would have the resources
necessary to provide the opportunity for a sound basic education).
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past two decades, additional money will not, without more, solve
the chronic problems of educating students, and the manner in
which the money is spent matters most.270 If teachers are the most
important aspect of school quality, then courts must be more
mindful of how states spend money on them. Demonstrating that
courts can and should act does not, however, answer the question of
what exactly they should do, particularly in an area riddled with
competing social science, policy proposals, and teachers rights. The
answer to this question is the subject of Part III.
III. REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATIONS APPROACH TO
TEACHING
In the last few years, a political and legal movement has formed
to leverage school finance precedent to fundamentally alter the
teaching profession.271 A group of influential reformers became con-
vinced that eliminating or restricting teacher tenure was the neces-
sary first step to reforming teacher policy because tenure locks in
the status quo.272 So long as teacher tenure as we currently know it
exists, new teacher compensation, accountability, and evaluation
schemes face enormous roadblocks.273 Without tenure, reformers
posit that schools would remove the worst teachers and the rest
would be motivated to improve.274 School finance precedent poten-
tially provided the key to unlock these reforms and resist the
political power of teacher unions.275
Embedded within each of the fifty state constitutions is a right to
an equal and/or adequate education.276 The new movement theorized
that tenure and the retention of ineffective teachers violates this
constitutional right.277 Reformers argued that [i]f unequal funding
violates the constitutional right to education, so too might ineffec-
270. Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 440-41 (N.J. 1997).
271. See Black, supra note 7, at 77-79.
272. Id. at 78.
273. See Dagostino, supra note 114, at 191-95, 210-12.
274. Black, supra note 7, at 78.
275. Id. at 79.
276. Id. at 108.
277. Haley Sweetland Edwards, Takingon Teacher Tenure, TIME, Nov. 3, 2014, at 35, 36
(noting that reform-oriented individuals saw litigation as the only way to break the national
gridlock).
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tive teaching caused by tenure.278 Advocates chose California as
the testing ground for this theory, filing their first case, Vergara v.
State, in 2012.279
To the surprise of many, the trial court accepted this theory in
2014.280 At that point, the movement was off to the races. Advocates
immediately filed an almost identical case in New York281 and
promised to bring cases in other states as well.282 The claims in
these cases rested on four factual allegations: (1) it is [too] easy to
get tenure; (2) easy tenure perpetuates the retention of ineffective
teachers; (3) tenure-and-reduction in force rules make it impossible
or too costly for districts to terminate ineffective teachers; and
(4) these ineffective teachers cause unequal, and therefore unconsti-
tutional, educational opportunities.283
At the theoretical level, the claim that teacher tenure violates
students constitutional right to education easily falls within the
rights previously articulated by various state courts. Courts broadly
articulate those rights in school finance precedent and make no at-
tempt to limit the rights to school funding or academic standards.284
Even if those rights were limited, tenure claims would most likely
fall within the scope of existing rights. Courts have explicitly recog-
nized quality teachers as a crucial input that states routinely fail to
deliver.285 The fact that courts have not thought closely about how
278. Black, supra note 7, at 79.
279. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2-5, Vergara v.
State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Vergara
Complaint].
280. Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *1-2.
281. Verified Amended Complaint at 4, Davids v. State, No. 101105/14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July
24, 2014) [hereinafter Davids Complaint].
282. Al Baker, Lawsuit Challenges New Yorks Teacher Tenure Laws, N.Y. TIMES (July 3,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/nyregion/lawsuit-contests-new-yorks-teacher-
tenure-laws.html [https://perma.cc/46ZB-AN33].
283. Black, supra note 7, at 124; see also Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 11-18;
Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 9-15.
284. See Black, supra note 229, at 390-403 (discussing the potential breadth of consti-
tutional rights to education); Ryan, supra note 5, at 307-10 (same); see also Scott R. Bauries,
A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education, 48 GA. L. REV. 949, 997-1006
(2014) (distinguishing education rights and duties).
285. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 498-99 (Ark. 2002);
CFE III, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2006); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 386-
87 (N.C. 2004).
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to remedy the problem or how tenure might fall within it is irrelevant.
The practical effects of teacher tenure, however, do not match the
theory. Plaintiffs assume a causal connection between tenure and
educational opportunities that is too simple and, as of yet, unsub-
stantiated. Far too many other factorsfor which plaintiffs do not
accountaffect teaching quality to conclude that tenure is decisive
or of crucial importance. In other words, plaintiffs narrow their
claim too far in regard to teachers. They would micromanage state
tenure and retention policy and ignore everything else.
The point of this Article is not to critique the challenge to tenure,
but to build on it without repeating its mistakes. The antitenure
movement is extremely important for what it gets right. It uses
school finance precedent to force courts to focus on the input that
matters mostteachersand insists that policy changes, not just
funding increases, are necessary to improve access to quality teach-
ers. These major steps forward provide a theoretical basis upon
which to build broader holistic reforms in teacher quality. In par-
ticular, school finance precedent should be leveraged toward three
categorical ends: equalizing teacher distribution; improving teacher
quality (through teacher development, hiring, evaluation, and firing
if necessary); and improving the conditions under which teachers
work.
This set of reforms is distinct from the challenge to tenure in
three important respects. First, this Articles proposed reforms are
grounded in evidence. Second, they are not remedial dictates; they
are factors that the state must address but which still afford the
state meaningful levels of discretion as to how. Third, the reforms
are holistic and avoid the fallacy of silver bullet solutions. The
following Sections address each of these points in regard to tenure
and this Articles proposed reforms.
A. Learningfrom the Constitutional Challenge to Tenure
The teacher tenure challenges currently being litigated in Cal-
ifornia and New York facially meet the basic requirements of a
constitutional education claim.286 The plaintiffs identify a state con-
stitutional duty in regard to education and allege a deficiency in
286. Black, supra note 7, at 123-24.
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carrying it out.287 They argue that some schools have such substan-
tial numbers of low-quality teachers that they deprive students of
their constitutional right to education.288 Emphasizing that teachers
are a key determinate of the quality of education a student receives,
they argue that regular exposure to low-quality teachers causes the
poor educational outcomes in these schools.289 They assign responsi-
bility for these low-quality teachers and outcomes not to the school,
but to the state.290 They argue that state statutes regulating teach-
er tenure and removal prevent schools from removing ineffective
teachers.291 These schools will, over time, lose many of their good
teachers and remain stuck with their worst. If these schools could
remove their worst teachers and replace them with just average
teachers, students would accrue enormously positive short-term and
long-term educational benefits.292 Thus, they say, tenure violates
students constitutional right to an equal or adequate education.293
At a level of generality and theory, the challenge to tenure has
significant merit. The importance of teachers is largely beyond
dispute now, and, like any other profession, surely a certain percen-
tage of teachers are very weak performers. If the existence of tenure
significantly exacerbates their numbers, constitutional concerns
should follow. By raising this point, the plaintiffs push courts to
take the teachers role in delivering a constitutionally required
education far more seriously than they have in the past. The claims
situate teachers not at the periphery of an adequacy or equity case,
but at the very center. Equally important, the claims attempt to
connect noneconomic state policy to what happens in the classroom
and the teaching profession overall. In these respects, the tenure
litigation is consistent with this Articles thesis that constitutional
education litigation must focus on teachers more squarely and not
assume that general changes in funding will naturally improve
teaching quality.
287. Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 2-4; Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 2-3.
288. Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 11; Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 4.
289. Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 3; Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 8-9.
290. Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 3-4; Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 3.
291. Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 3-4; Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 9-10.
292. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27,
2014); Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 8-9.
293. Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 20; Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 14-15.
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For all its insight, however, the tenure challenge is but one step
forward in a potential movement to reform school finance litigation
and teaching quality. It cannot take the second step because the
facts do not match the theory. The litigation does not even hint at
the broader dynamics that affect access to quality teachers. First,
like school finance precedent, it oversimplifies the cause of the prob-
lem. Whereas school finance cases assume salary gaps between
districts or regions are the cause of inadequate teachers,294 the
tenure challenges assume that sufficient numbers of adequate
teachers exist and that the problem is simply ridding schools of
ineffective ones.295 This leads the plaintiffs to another unsubstanti-
ated causal assumption: the reason why ineffective teachers are
retained is because the state forces districts to do so through stat-
ute.296 While removing teachers may be costly, available evidence
indicates that districts retain them for other reasons.297 Regardless,
courts in constitutional education litigation consistently require a
sophisticated analysis of causation. This means proving that some
state policy is the cause of a resource deprivation and that the dep-
rivation has a negative causal impact on educational outcomes.298
The tenure challenge fails to do this.
Second, these plaintiffs narrow the frame of the teacher problem
too far. They disconnect individual teachers from the broader teach-
er market and structures of educational opportunity. In other words,
they fixate on one aspect of teacher managementtenureand
ignore everything else.299 They then draw vast conclusions based on
294. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Ky. 1989); Le-
andro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. 1997).
295. Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 10; Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 8-9.
296. Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 3-4; Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 3.
297. See, e.g., EDWIN M. BRIDGES, THE INCOMPETENT TEACHER: MANAGERIAL RESPONSES
25-27 (rev. ed. 1992); DANA GOLDSTEIN, THE TEACHER WARS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAS MOST
EMBATTLED PROFESSION 241 (2014); Suzanne R. Painter, Principals Perceptions of Barriers
to Teacher Dismissal, 14 J. PERSONNEL EVALUATION EDUC. 253, 259-61 (2000).
298. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976) (There is a distinct relation-
ship between cost and the quality of educational opportunities afforded.); Abbott v. Burke,
575 A.2d 359, 383-84 (N.J. 1990) (recognizing dispute over whether and how money matters);
CFE II, 801 N.E.2d 326, 343 (N.Y. 2003) (state argued that inefficient management of
personnel is the supervening cause ... rather than the funding system); id. at 335 ([P]lain-
tiffs had to show that insufficient funding led to inadequate inputs which led to unsatisfactory
results.).
299. Plaintiffs challenge teacher retention policies during reductions in force in addition
to tenure, but this is only a variant of the overall concept of removing ineffective teachers who
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the narrow problem, asserting that deficiencies at a micro level
individual grossly ineffective teachers scattered across a district
are the cause of a macro problem that rises to the level of a constitu-
tional problem. Even if plaintiffs are correct that tenure protects
grossly ineffective teachers from dismissal, it does not follow that
this group of teachers is sufficient in number to undermine educa-
tional opportunity in general, which is a requirement in school
finance precedent.300 It may be the case that these ineffective teach-
erswhom tenure protectsare a part of a larger systematic
problem in the profession or make an already problematic educa-
tional environment worse, but plaintiffs make no attempt to account
for the broader context.
That necessary broader context includes the teacher labor mar-
ket, the educational environment in which these and other weak
teachers teach, and the overall educational opportunities offered in
disadvantaged schools. The flaw of school finance, on the whole, has
been to largely ignore the market and educational environment that
affects teaching. But courts have always demanded evidence of the
constellation of inputs, outcomes, and factors that make up educa-
tional opportunity.301 Sophisticated or not, these cases correctly
conceptualize teachers as an evidentiary piece of a much larger
puzzle of inadequate or inequitable education.302 The flaw of tenure
challenges is to disconnect teaching quality from the market, the
teaching environment, and other nonteaching factors that go into
educational opportunity. In short, the tenure challenge strips teach-
er quality from the broader context of education and teachers.
The challenge to tenure compounds the foregoing flaws by calling
for a remedy that is too specific and too narrow. School finance
have vested interests based on tenure or seniority. See Vergara Complaint, supra note 279,
at 17-18; Davids Complaint, supra note 281, at 12-14.
300. See Sheff v. ONeill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1287 (Conn. 1996) ([P]laintiffs must make a
prima facie showing that the disparities ... are more than de minimis. (quoting Horton v.
Meskill, 486 A.2d 1099, 1106 (Conn. 1984))); CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 332-36 (concluding that
test results and graduation rates reflected systemic failure and that the States actions were
a substantial cause of the constitutional violation).
301. See, e.g., CFE II, 801 N.E.2d at 328-29 (discussing the lower courts factual findings
concerning inputs, outputs, and causation).
302. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 500 (Ark. 2002)
(finding discrepancies in curriculum, facilities, equipment, and teacher pay); CFE III, 861
N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2006) (discussing multiple aspects of education in assessing overall
adequacy).
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precedent does not presuppose a singular or narrow solution to the
problems it raises.303 Prior cases might identify a states funding
scheme that relies heavily on local property tax as the cause of
inadequate funding and opportunity, but the challenge would not be
a per se challenge to funding schemes built on local taxes.304 A state
could theoretically retain local funding so long as it otherwise
ensured that adequate funds were available for schools. Retaining
this flexibility, moreover, is part and parcel of separation of powers
constraints in school finance cases.305 Most courts would dictate a
more specific remedy only in the face of state intransigence over a
period of time.306 The tenure cases, in contrast, present a per se
challenge to tenure and retention policies307 and clearly envision an-
other approach the state must take.308 Not only does the approach
potentially transcend separation of powers boundaries, but it also
disregards the possibility of other solutions.
In sum, the constitutional challenge to tenure does two important
things that prior school finance litigation has failed to do: focus
squarely on teachers and move beyond just money. But it also com-
mits three errors that school finance litigation does not: assuming
causation, ignoring educational context, and dictating a remedy.
The next Section builds on the constitutional challenge to tenures
strength and strips away its flaws.
B. An Expanded and Nuanced Approach to TeachingQuality
The constitutional challenge to tenure is pushing courts and
states to be far more attentive to teacher quality. The task of future
303. See generally Bauries, supra note 284.
304. See Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 620 (Ct. App. 1986) (requiring substantial
disparities that affect outcomes); Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1188-89
(Ill. 1996).
305. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 214 (Ky. 1989) (It is
now up to the General Assembly to re-create, and re-establish [the] system.); Hoke Cty. Bd.
of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 396-97 (N.C. 2004) (reversing lower court remedy because
state gets first opportunity); McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 232 (Wash. 2011) (refusing to
specify standards for staffing ratios, salaries, and other program requirements).
306. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 460-61 (N.J. 1998); Campbell I, 907 P.2d 1238,
1246 (Wyo. 1995).
307. See Edwards, supra note 277, at 36.
308. Vergara Complaint, supra note 279, at 4-5 (asserting state statutes are facially uncon-
stitutional).
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litigants and courts is to build upon that instinct and move school
finance litigation toward a far more nuanced analysis of the problem
of teacher quality and potential remedies to it. This nuance, more-
over, makes sense as part of the natural evolution of the school
finance movement from one aimed only at utterly gross inade-
quacies and inequities that require blunt force remedies to one that
pushes states to go further and move schools from marginal ade-
quacy to consistent high quality.309 To do otherwise is to leave school
finance litigation open to critiques of wasted money and ineptness
in improving educational opportunities.
None of this is to suggest that courts are competent to microman-
age teacher policy. To the contrary, courts lack substantive expertise
in education policy. But courts do have expertise in identifying rele-
vant factors to substantive problems and disputes, setting standards
by which parties should act, and holding actors accountable for fail-
ing to consider the relevant factors and act according to the appro-
priate standard.310 This expertise can force states to develop policies
they otherwise would not and account for evidence they otherwise
would ignore. In the context of teachers, this means forcing states
to address the fundamental challenges in the profession that impede
educational quality and equality rather than simply reformulating
budgets and ignoring teacher policies. Courts can do this through a
five-pronged approach: (1) moving beyond focusing on money alone
to analyze a broader set of factors affecting quality teaching, (2)
requiring the equitable distribution of existing teachers, and
improving teacher quality by (3) making the profession attractive,
(4) supporting teachers once they enter the profession, and (5)
removing those who are ineffective, notwithstanding support and a
proper environment.
1. Understandingthe Problem Is Not Money, Tenure, or Any
Other Single Factor
As argued throughout this Article, the first and most important
step courts must take is to broaden the scope of their analysis
regarding teachers, not narrow it. Both school finance opinions and
309. See generally Black, supra note 7.
310. See generally REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 20.
2016] TAKING TEACHER QUALITY SERIOUSLY 1659
the current constitutional challenge to tenure run from complexity
rather than confront it. Therein lies the fundamental flaw. Existing
teachers choose to work (and not work) within a varying context
of geography, professional options, school building environments,
professional support, student body needs, and salary require-
ments.311 Potential teachers likewise operate within a broader econ-
omic and intellectual market in which teaching competes with other
careers.312
These complexities cannot be reduced to frameworks premised on
singular solutions, such as closing salary gaps or ending tenure.
This is not to suggest that money does not matter or that current
tenure policies work well, but rather that neither salary changes
aloneat least ones that states are reasonably willing to offernor
the elimination of tenure will ensure quality instruction in all class-
rooms. No silver bullet exists to resolve the problem. Courts should
presume the opposite and demand that states account for and
address all of the internal and external forces that operate on the
teaching market and students access to quality teachers. In gener-
al, the relevance of these factors is not in dispute. They are just not
accounted for and addressed. Thus, courts need not mediate social
science evidence or devise novel policy reforms; they need to demand
that states focus on the factors that matter.
2. The Unequal Distribution of Quality Teachers Is Distinct
from a Shortage
Inadequate access to quality teachers includes two distinct struc-
tural aspects: an actual shortage of highly qualified teachers and
an unequal distribution of those we have. Courts should recognize
and address both. In the past, courts have focused predominantly on
the shortage, if focusing on teachers at all.313 Most shortages are
311. See generally LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73; Boyd et al., supra note 23; Hanushek
& Rivkin, supra note 90; Loeb, Darling-Hammond & Luczak, supra note 92.
312. See, e.g., LOEB & REININGER, supra note 73, at ii, iv. See generally Darling-Hammond,
supra note 146; Ingersoll & Merrill, supra note 24.
313. See, e.g., W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Neeley, No. GV-100528, 2004
WL 5719215, at *23-24 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Nov. 30, 2004) (focusing on the severe shortage of
qualified teachers); Campbell II, 19 P.3d 518, 550 (Wyo. 2001) (Because teacher quality is
critical to providing a constitutional education ..., the legislature is also directed to monitor
the supply of qualified teachers and take appropriate action.). 
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manageable so long as they are equally distributed.314 But, as a
practical matter, even small shortages have proved problematic
because their effects are often concentrated in particular districts.315
Although this concentration is currently driven by teacher choice,
it is not beyond the states control. To the contrary, states current
funding and assignment policies, among others, play a huge role in
unequally distributing the teachers that are in the market.316 These
same policies can be leveraged to do the opposite.
Independent of the supply of quality teachers, courts should de-
mand that states address the maldistribution of quality teachers.
School finance precedent arguably already requires as much. That
precedent generally obligates states to address their distributional
failures in regard to key education resources and regularly indicates
that the manner in which states and local school districts allocate
their resources is as important as the amount of resources they
have.317 Equity litigation, for instance, is inherently premised on the
notion that a state must structure its finance system to provide all
school districts equal access to resources.318 If the inequitable distri-
bution of a resource affects educational opportunity in a state where
education is a fundamental right or students have a right to equal
educational opportunity, the distribution is facially problematic.319
Strategic distribution of resources is not as obviously required in
adequacy cases but still exists. So long as all schools still meet the
minimum constitutional quality benchmarks, states can theoreti-
cally waste resources and ignore inequality.320 In practice, however,
314. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 27, at 1-2 (arguing that there is not actually a
shortage of quality teachers but a maldistribution of them).
315. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 73-75, 85-86 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 160-61 (S.C.
2014).
316. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 85-86.
317. See, e.g., Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 388-89 (N.C. 2004) (discuss-
ing the States and local districts responsibility to allocate resources strategically); Abbott v.
Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 377-82 (N.J. 1990) (discussing the variance in how efficiently districts
use their funds and the problem it creates in determining whether money matters).
318. See Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 493, 497-98 (1995) (discussing two approaches to litigating school finance equity
cases, both premised on an equal protection argument).
319. See id. at 505-11, 513 (discussing the scrutiny both state courts and the Supreme
Court applied to inequities or resource allocation within state education systems).
320. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (rejecting equality claim
by permitting adequacy claim); see also William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When Adequate Isnt:
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delivering quality educational opportunities to all students also
requires strategic resource distribution.321 The North Carolina Su-
preme Court, for instance, rooted the States educational failures in
the fact that neither the State nor ... [its school districts] are
strategically allocating the available resources to see that at-risk
children have the equal opportunity to obtain a sound basic educa-
tion.322 Rather than simply mandate more resources, the court
directed both the state and the school district[s] to conduct self-
examinations of the present allocation of resources and to produce
a rational[ ], comprehensive plan which strategically focuses availa-
ble resources and funds towards meeting the needs of all children,
including at-risk children[,] to obtain a sound basic education.323
As many as twenty state constitutions include explicit language
that speaks to this distributional principle.324 These state constitu-
tions mandate an efficient education.325 Courts have found that
this efficiency mandate carries the normal dictionary meaning:
[P]erforming or functioning in the best possible manner with the
least waste of time and effort and satisfactory and economical to
use.326 The West Virginia Supreme Court wrote that this mandate
requires the education system be absolutely complete, attentive to
every detail, extending beyond ordinary parameters.... [I]t must
produce results without waste, and it requires careful state and
local supervision to prevent waste and to monitor pupil, teacher and
The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L.J.
545, 562-65 (2006).
321. See Weishart, supra note 22, at 537-38.
322. Hoke Cty., 599 S.E.2d at 388-89 (quoting trial court).
323. Id. at 389; see also Small Schools I, 851 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1993) (indicating that
the State should impose funding and management responsibilities upon counties, municipal-
ities, and school districts and prevent mismanagement).
324. Black, supra note 229, at 399-400; see, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 14, § 1; DEL. CONST. art.
X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; MD. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, ¶ 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA.
CONST. art. III, § 14; TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
325. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 183 (The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation,
provide an efficient system of common schools throughout the State.).
326. Black, supra note 229, at 400 (quoting Efficient Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://
dictionary.reference.com/browse/efficient [https://perma.cc/UP3N-6PLS] (last visited Mar. 30,
2016)); see, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 210 (Ky. 1989); Pauley
v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 874 (W. Va. 1979).
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administrative competency.327 The Kentucky Supreme Court sim-
ilarly emphasized:
The General Assembly must not only establish the [qualitatively
adequate educational] system, but it must monitor it on a con-
tinuing basis so that it will always be maintained in a constitu-
tional manner. The General Assembly must carefully supervise
it, so that there is no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement,
at any level.328
In short, school finance precedent articulates a duty not just to fund
and support schools but also to ensure that schools are run well and
to maximize the impact of the resources the state provides. This
entails strategic allocation, distribution, and monitoring of resources
at the state and local levels. It is also worth noting that enforcing
this mandate falls more squarely within the purview of courts than
any other educational concept because efficiency amounts to a defi-
nite structural obligation rather than a qualitative educational con-
cept.329
These equitable distribution principles should apply with added
force to teachers. Funding inequities require nuanced analysis of
the manner in which school funds are generated and how much each
particular school needs based on demographic, geographic, and
other factors.330 Identifying the inequitable distribution of teachers,
however, is simple by comparison. Basic math reveals that disad-
vantaged geographic and demographic groups have fewer teachers,
and those they have are less credentialed and qualified by almost
any measure one might use.331 No expert analysis is required to
reach this conclusion. Remedying the maldistribution of teachers
327. Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 874, 877.
328. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211.
329. Concepts of adequacy, thoroughness, or high quality necessarily call on courts to make
qualitative educational assessments. It is also worth emphasizing that a courts competency
and judicial authority is at its peak in regard to efficiency because the term efficient is, in
key respects, less ambiguous than other educational mandates.
330. See Bradley W. Joondeph, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: An Empirical Analysis
of Litigation-Prompted School Finance Reform, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763, 769-72 (1995).
331. See, e.g., Reed v. State, No. BC43240, 2011 WL 10893745, at *21-25 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Feb. 8, 2011) (finding that constant teacher turnover has led to unqualified teachers and long-
term substitutes disrupting students ability to receive a coherent lesson plan); EDUC. TR.,
supra note 29, at 2.
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would implicate more complex questions, but the question of how
best to remedy the maldistribution is separate from whether mal-
distribution exists and violates the Constitution. The answer to
these latter questions is simply, yes.
The answer of how to remedy maldistribution is three-fold. The
first step is for states to end those aforementioned funding, stu-
dent assignment, and teacher assignment policies that incentivize
and exacerbate the maldistribution.332 In other words, state policies
must be part of the solution, not the problem. The second step is for
states to offer meaningful incentives for the most effective teachers
to remain in or move to disadvantaged and high-need schools.
States past incentive experiments have been small, particularly in
light of the disincentives to teaching in high-need schools that other
state policies create.333 The third step is to carry out the overall
strategy for improving teacher quality that is outlined in the next
Section. Improving teacher quality overall would ease the intense
competition for quality teachers that currently leads to maldistri-
bution.
3. ImprovingTeacher Quality Through Recruitment, Retention,
and Removal
Remedying the shortage of quality teachers is a function of three
factors: bringing more strong candidates into the profession, keep-
ing the best teachers in the profession, and removing the weakest
teachers. Closing salary gaps between districts or statesthe cur-
rent prevailing remedydoes not necessarily address any of these
factors and certainly does not address all three. Simply closing sala-
ry gaps is primarily an attempt at internal redistribution of
teachers, albeit insufficient in and of itself.334
332. See supra notes 313-31 and accompanying text.
333. See Sims, supra note 98, at 1043.
334. Studies have found that other factors tend to weigh heavily in a teachers decision on
where to teach. Thus, closing the salary gap may not cause teachers to migrate to the teaching
profession or high-need schools. See Boyd et al., supra note 23, at 57, 73-74, 77.
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a. EnsuringCompetitive Salaries
Bringing stronger candidates into the profession requires salaries
commensurate with or in excess of what those individuals might
earn in other professions. Current teacher salaries are well below
that level.335 Thus, current salary incentives must increase. Courts
must push states to provide salaries that respond to this reality.
With that said, the solution to the shortage of quality teachers is not
simply increasing all existing or new teachers salaries. Past expe-
rience suggests that a quick remedy of this nature will do little to
change or increase the quality of those entering the profession.336
More likely, it will increase the salary of those who already teach or
are considering teaching,337 which might be warranted as a general
principle and help with long-term solutions, but that is not the
immediate goal. Instead, both short-term and long-term goals could
be achieved more efficiently through targeted salary incentives,
with a phasing in of higher overall salaries over time.338 A court,
however, need not order any specific salary policies as a remedy. It
would be enough for a court to focus states on the relevant factor:
the competitiveness of teaching compared with other professions. If
quality teaching is part of a constitutional education, states must
devote the resources realistically necessary to secure it.
b. LeveragingTeacher Pipelines
States must pursue strategies beyond just salary to change the
pool of those entering the teaching profession. States control the
teacher pipeline through certification programs, training programs,
institutions of higher education, and financial aid and scholarships,
335. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 12, 110; Ingersoll & Merrill, supra note 24,
at 188, 193-94.
336. Boyd et al., supra note 23, at 57, 73-75, 77.
337. Sims, supra note 98, at 1042-43 (discussing what he calls rent capture increases in
teacher salary).
338. Some of these raises will inevitably produce windfalls for some teachers, but this may
just be the cost of doing business as a state attempts to transform the profession. Surely, the
inverse pattern occurs when a state lets salaries dip. In the early years, states will retain
high-quality teachers, but over time they will leave the profession or the state. In other words,
short-term thinking in the area of teacher salaries, whether it is increasing or decreasing
them, will have long-term consequences.
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just to name a few.339 But states currently do little to leverage this
pipeline to attract the strongest candidates. Instead, they accept
almost all interested students to colleges of educationwhich brings
down the prestige of the professionand then attempt to counter-
act that open door policy by imposing a strict and burdensome
certification process at the end.340 This is the exact opposite of what
successful education systems do in other countries.341 Again, a court
need not dictate any specific change to the teaching pipeline, but it
should hold the state accountable for leveraging that pipeline itself,
as the state exerts more direct influence on the teaching market
through the pipeline than any other strategy.
c. Improvingthe TeachingEnvironment
Salaries are relevant to keeping the best teachers in the pro-
fession. If salaries are not high enough to consistently attract
high-quality candidates to teaching, they are not high enough to
consistently keep them either. With that said, salaries are not
exclusively controlling at the hiring or retention stages.342 At reten-
tion, salary may be even less relevant.343 Surveys indicate that
teachers want fair salaries, not exorbitant ones.344
By reducing teacher hiring and retention solely to salaries, states
and courts overlook the other equally important aspect of hiring
and retaining teachers: creating environments conducive to the
339. See PREPARING TEACHERS FOR A CHANGING WORLD: WHAT TEACHERS SHOULD LEARN
AND BE ABLE TO DO 408, 414-16 (Linda Darling-Hammond & John Bransford eds., 2005)
[hereinafter PREPARING TEACHERS]; ROBIN R. HENKE ET AL., NATL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,
PROGRESS THROUGH THE TEACHER PIPELINE: 1992-93 COLLEGE GRADUATES AND ELEMEN-
TARY/SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHING AS OF 1997, at 23-26, 28 (2000); Boyd et al., supra note
23, at 58-59, 61-62, 68-70.
340. See Michael A. Rebell, Safeguardingthe Right to a Sound Basic Education in Times
of Fiscal Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1944-46 (2012).
341. See id. at 1949 (discussing the prestige of the teaching profession in Finland, South
Korea, and Singapore); see also DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 163-93 (discussing how
other countries make the teaching profession more attractive).
342. See PREPARING TEACHERS, supra note 339, at 110.
343. See id. at 40-41.
344. See REPORTS OF THE HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYL-
VANIA PART 2, at 122, 130 (1883) (finding that, as far as teachers are concerned, a fair salary
is necessary); Patrick J. Kearney, When Did Teachers Become So Unpopular?(Dec. 14, 2014),
https://patrickjkearney.wordpress.com/2014/12/ [https://perma.cc/6RSE-HXBL] (asserting that
teachers have worked over time to be fairly compensated).
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demanding work expected of teachers. Teachers regularly cite the
environmentnot their salaryas the reason they leave teaching
or a particular school.345 Changing the environment will have its
own independent benefits to teacher quality and presumably have
reciprocal positive effects on the actual salary necessary to recruit
and retain teachers.
For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to say that quality of
the environment depends on the physical place where a teacher
teaches, the number of students for which a teacher is responsible
(class size and course load), student behavior in the classroom, the
administrative and support services available, and professional de-
velopment opportunities. All but student behavior are entirely
within the control of the state,346 and most of these environmental
factors already arise as part of educational equity and quality liti-
gation.347 Moving the analysis in those cases toward the theory of
this Article, however, requires a change in framing. The current
question in those cases tends to be whether class size, facilities, or
any other resource has a direct correlation with student outcomes.
If not, a court might deem those resources irrelevant. But if the edu-
cational environment is relevant to teacher quality, these factors
should remain important, regardless of whether they can be closely
correlated with student outcomes.348
In short, courts should continue to focus on those educational
inputs that have been shown to affect educational outcomes.
Teachers are foremost among those factors. But unlike other re-
sources, teachers cannot simply be bought and sold by the highest
bidder. Thus, courts should focus states on addressing those non-
345. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 1, at 40-41 ([W]orking conditions are at least as
powerful as salaries in predicting whether schools can recruit and retain teachers who have
other options.); Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin supra note 92, at 328, 335-37 (finding that exper-
ienced teachers moved to high-socioeconomic status schools when positions were available).
346. Student behavior and discipline are issues of distinct significance that require
strategies that go well beyond the scope of this Article, but it suffices to say here that the
environment matters to students as well. Smaller classes matter because they create a more
manageable workload for teachers, but they also matter in creating a more personal and well-
behaved classroom.
347. See, e.g., CFE III, 861 N.E.2d 50, 52-53 (N.Y. 2006); DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993,
1020-21 (Ohio 2000).
348. New Yorks highest court, for instance, reasoned that safe and adequate facilities were
part of a constitutional education even though the plaintiffs could not demonstrate their effect
on student achievement. CFE III, 861 N.E.2d at 59-60.
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monetary factors that affect teaching quality and comprise the over-
all environment in which they work.
d. ManagingTeacher Quality: Evaluations, Remediation,
and Tenure
Finally, putting aside the question of how many grossly ineffec-
tive teachers currently teach and whether their numbers rise to the
level of an independent constitutional violation,349 the possibility
that a school cannot get rid of incompetent teachers raises constitu-
tional concerns. If the state must improve its recruitment, hiring,
and environment as part of a holistic approach to teachers, it is hard
to argue that removing ineffective ones, if necessary, is not part of
that approach.350
The more complicated questions are how to reliably identify inef-
fective teachers and what to do with them. The current litigation in
California and New York assumes that we will recognize ineffective
teachers by their students test scores and that the solution is to
eliminate or delay tenure and minimize due process so that schools
can more easily remove these teachers. None of these assumptions
is self-evident. Interpreting student test scores, controlling for the
various demographic factors necessary to compare apples to apples,
and attributing them to individual teachers has proved to be very
difficult to do fairly and reliably.351 One of the worst things the state
could do is pressure or eliminate teachers who are actually doing
their job well.
For that reason, the process of removal must proceed carefully
and fairly. Doing so may involve significant unavoidable costs. If so,
the answer is not to eliminate tenure or process; the answer is for
the state to provide schools the support necessary to carry out teach-
er removals. For instance, the state might create a fund for teacher
removal or take responsibility for carrying out the process itself.
349. As explored at length in Black, supra note 7, the number of grossly ineffective teachers
has been estimated only; the estimate is not necessarily a high one and likely does not meet
the constitutional requirements for establishing harm or state-level causation.
350. By ineffective, this Article means a teacher who lacks the skill or desire to be effec-
tive. Because environment matters, teachers may not produce student gains because they are
in an environment that makes effectiveness elusive. Teachers should not become the scape-
goat for education ills over which they themselves have no control.
351. Baker et al., supra note 122, at 6-8, 16-18.
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Either way, schools with ineffective teachers are not caught in an
intractable situation. On the other hand, if the process can be car-
ried out more efficiently without sacrificing fairness, states should
pursue those options.
The definitive answers and solutions to each of these issues,
however, are irrelevant for courts. The role of courts is to identify
the relevant issue. Here, that issue is the ability to remove ineffec-
tive teachers, when necessary, as part of a holistic approach to
improving teaching quality. The conditions under which to remove
(or remediate) a teacher should, consistent with separation of pow-
ers, remain within the states purview, so long as the state ensures
a process consistent with improving the quality of teaching.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional challenge to tenure spreading across the na-
tion has exposed an enormous hole in previous litigation over the
constitutional right to educationthe failure to focus on what mat-
ters most. Whereas the challenge to tenure focuses exclusively on
teachers, past litigation over the constitutional right to education
has focused almost exclusively on money. Past litigation has as-
sumed that more money would indirectly improve teaching quality
and that inequities between school districts would disappear. This
assumption has proved false. Poor and minority students are still
exposed to ineffective teaching at twice the rate of other students.
The challenge of ensuring quality teachers for disadvantaged stu-
dents is far too important and complex to leave to chance.
The initial theory and success of the constitutional challenge to
tenure offers a potential path to reinvigorating and refocusing the
constitutional right to education to address these challenges. The
tenure litigation has demonstrated that the precedent regarding the
constitutional right to education is sufficiently broad to encompass
demands for teacher quality reforms. Both courts and the public
appear receptive. Unfortunately, the substantive theory of the ten-
ure litigation is no more likely to improve and reform teaching than
is school funding litigation because it also oversimplifies the prob-
lem of ineffective teaching. The tenure challenges naïvely assume
that if schools could just remove the worst teachers, teacher quality
would dramatically improve.
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The goal of future litigants and courts should be both to build on
the insights of the challenge to tenure and to avoid that strategys
flaws. This entails bringing a laser-like focus to teaching quality
and forcing states to account for the extensive body of research that
demonstrates that realistic solutions must account for the pipeline
into teaching, structural forces related to race and geography, the
general desirability of the teaching profession, and the conditions
under which teachers work. This deeper engagement of teacher
quality would represent a natural evolution and maturation of
school finance precedent.
The facts in past school finance cases have included troubling
disparities in almost every aspect of education, from teachers and
facilities to technology, transportation, and instructional supplies,
just to name a few. These disparities have been so gross that the
education systems would have fallen below almost any constitu-
tional standard or approach, so long as a court defined the required
education as something more than just a building with teachers and
books. As states eliminate the grossest disparities, the important
question will be exactly where the constitutional threshold lies and
how states can meet it. Is it enough to eliminate gross disparities,
or must states refine their education systems to deliver educational
opportunities that are, in fact, equal and substantively adequate?
This inquiry is necessarily more complex and nuanced, and teaching
quality lies at the center of it. Thus, deepening the analysis of teach-
er quality is the necessary next step in meeting the constitutional
obligation of equal and adequate education.

